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IGNORANCE AND MISTAKE IN CRIMINAL LAW
JEROME HALLtI

At the threshold of inquiry into the criminal liability of persons who
commit harms under the influence of ignorance or mistake, one confronts an insistent perennial question-why should such persons be subjected to any criminal liability? Ignorantiafacti excwsat accords with the
implied challenge. But ignorantiajurisneminem excusat seems to oppose
it and to require explanation. This problem has recently been reexamined by many European scholars1 whose discussions suggest that
Certainly, the
further study of the Anglo-American law is desirable.'
usual taking of numerous "exceptions" to ignorantiajuris neminem excusat and ignorantiafacti excusat leaves the law disorganized and obscures the significance of these doctrines.8 It is easy to see that analysis
may well begin with the insight that, while coercion and necessity, e.g.,
t Distinguished Service Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1.
2.

See the symposium in REv. INTN'L DE DROIT Pi NAL, Nos. 3 and 4 (1955).
This article revises and amplifies chapter 11 of the writer's GENERAL PRINCIPLES

OF CRImINAL LAW (1947).
3. Several excellent articles are available, and the writer is indebted especially to
the following: Keedy, Igiwraice and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARV. L. REv. 75
(1908); Stumberg, Mistake of Law in Texas Criminal Cases, 15 TEx. L. REv. 287
(1937); Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criininal Law, 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 35

(1939); L. Hall and Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U. oF CHI. L. REv.
641 (1941).
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directly concern volition, ignorance and mistake immediately involve
cognition. From there the trail leads plainly to mens rea and other principles of criminal liability; and the indications are that a thorough elucidation of the two doctrines must deal especially with the foundation of
penal law-the principle of legality.
IGNORANTIA FACTI EXCUSAT

Factual Error and the Ethics of the Doctrine
"Ignorance" and "mistake" are words of ancient mintage which
have been discussed in all ages by the wise and the prudent, by realists
and idealists, and many others. We need not here review this vast literature on the theories of human limitations, but we may note certain widely
accepted conclusions which are important in the present legal inquiry.
Except for utter skeptics (who seem to claim knowledge of their negations), it is agreed that knowledge exists; and the contrary of that is
ignorance. Likewise, except for those sophisticates who hold that factual
errors are non-existent because all perception is "relative" to the given
conditions, mistakes also occur. This is assumed in numerous studies
which have shown that mistakes of perception are much more common
than even trial lawyers suspect.' The existence of ignorance and mistake
is also assumed in modern systems of penal law, and they are rarely distinguished. The distinction noted by Story that, "Mistake of facts always supposes some error of opinion as to the real facts; but ignorance
of facts may be without any error, but result in mere want of knowledge
or opinion,"' has had no appreciable effect on the law.
The meaning of "factual error," as defined in the criminal law,
represents a common sense version of the philosopher's definition: "All
error consists in taking for real what is mere appearance." 6 For example,
a person looks at a far-off object and believes he sees a man; later, on
closer approach, he decides it is a tree. The first opinion is then recognized
as error. But the object may not actually be a tree; perhaps it is a dead
stump or a bit of sculpture. Indeed, on examining it the next morning by
aid of daylight and a clear head, our actor decides that he was mistaken
in both judgments the night before. In this view he will be supported by
all normal persons who, viewing the object under "adequate" conditions,
agree: "It is a tree stump"; moreover, they would not concede the pos4. See BURTT, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY c. 2 (1931); SPINDLER, THE SENSE OF SIGHT
85 (1917) ; WIGmORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF 391-418 (1937).
5. 1 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 158 (13th ed. 1886). Cf. "Ignorance implies
a total want of knowledge in reference to the subject matter. Mistake admits a knowledge, but implies a wrong conclusion." Hutton v. Edgerton, 6 S.C. 485, 489 (1875).
6. STOUT, Error, in STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY 271 (1930).
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sibility of the slightest error in this opinion. Thus, an opinion (judgment or belief) is erroneous by reference to another opinion which corresponds to the facts. In sum, "error" implies:
1. That facts exist;
2. That sense impressions of facts, "sensa," are different from the
facts;
3. That the sensa fit (correspond to, are congruent with) or do
not fit the facts;'
4. That erroneous sensa (those that do not fit the facts) are for a
time accepted as true, i.e. they are believed to be congruent with the
facts;8 and

5. That this is later recognized as erroneous, i.e., certain opinions
become error when they are subjected to a broader experience, especially
when relatively adequate conditions of correct perception obtain.
All mistakes of fact can be reduced to the above elements which are
frequently directly applicable to the cases. There is, e.g., a mistake in
identity, in believing that a pocket or drawer contains things, that a person is being attacked, that a dangerous weapon is in an assailant's hand,
and so on. But while every case of mistake of fact can be stated in terms
of the above criteria, it is also true that many such mistakes involve much
more than perception. For example, in situations relevant to libel, perjury, or bigamy, the defendant may never have sensed the phenomena
which he erroneously interpreted. Someone may have told him that X
served a term in the penitentiary for forgery; he may have heard X's
employer discharge him, and read in the newspaper that forged checks
had been found in the possession of a certain employee of that firm; or
someone may have informed a woman that he had learned "on good
authority" of the death of her husband. Thus, mistakes of fact often result not only from faulty perception but also from erroneous higher types
of cognitive experience, e.g., the ideas already in the interpreter's
mind, including his bias. In the case of an inventor who makes certain
mistakes of fact, these ideas may include invalid theories of physics.
To understand the rationale of ignorantiafacti erccusat, it is necessary to recognize and take account of the relevant ethical principle,
namely, moral obligation is determined not by the actual facts but by the
actor's opinion regarding them. It is determined by the actor's error
concerning a situation, not by the actual situation. This is implicit in
7. ROGERs, The Problem of Error, in

(1920).

ESSAYS IN CRITicAL tEALIsa

117, 119

8. "Error would not be error were we not convinced whilst erring that we were
knowing the truth." ARON, THE NATURE OF KNOWING 57 (1930).
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the decisions, and occasionally it has been rather definitely expressed.'
For example, the driver of an automobile who turned a corner very
quickly, although he thought he would probably meet a car coming from
the opposite direction, would certainly be doing wrong despite the fact
that there was actually no car there. Again, it is often impossible to
know the facts or to know that any act of ours will improve a situation.
If the actual facts determined our duties, we would sometimes be under a
moral obligation without knowing it, perhaps without being able to discover it. Accordingly, apart from questions of previous incapacitation, the
morality of an act is determined by reference to the actor's opinion of the
facts, including his erroneous beliefs.1" Aristotle came to the same conclusion on the ground that behavior in ignorance of the facts is involuntary,"
and that view was adopted by Hale.12 With reference to the above analysis of the meaning of factual error and of the relevant ethical principle,
certain guides are available to aid appraisal of the penal law.
Illustrative Cases
That the above ethical principle has long been expressed in the
criminal law is apparent from an early 17th century case. 3 The defendant was awakened in the night by strange noises in his house; thinking he was attacking a burglar, he ran his sword through a cabinet where
the intruder was hiding and killed a friend of his servant, present by the
latter's invitation. This was held not to be manslaughter, "for he did
it ignorantly without intention of hurt to the said Francis."' 4 Perhaps
the most frequent situation in the cases and certainly the least doubted
instance of the recognized defense of mistake of fact concerns apparently
necessary self-defense. Here the courts hold, "it is not ncessary .
that defendant should have been actually in danger of death or great
bodily harm at the time he fired the fatal shot, or that retreat would
have really increased his peril, in order for him to have been justified
in shooting deceased."' 5 So, too, if the mistake stimulates an attack,
9. Steinmeyer v. People, 95 Ill. 383, 389 (1880) ; Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 149
(1860); Thomas v. The King, 59 Commw. L.R. 279, 299-300 (Austr. 1937).
10. See Prichard, Duty and Ignoranwe of Fact, XVIII PROC. BRITISH ACADEMY 67
(1932). Prichard's essay is summarized and discussed by Ross, FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS

148-65 (1939).
11.

ETHICA NICOMACHEA, bk. V.8, 1135a, 20-25 (Ross transl. 1925).

12. 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 42 (1736).
13. Levett's Case, Cro. Car. 538, 79 Eng. Rep. 1064 (K.B. 1638).
14. Ibid. Cf. ". . . if this be ignorance of fact it excuses.... ".The
Justices 137 (Seld. Soc'y ed. 1893).

15. Williams v. State, 18 Ala. App. 473, 93 So. 57, 58 (1922).

Mirror of

On the above

ground the following instruction was reversed: ". . . the jury is told that the right
of self-defense cannot be exercised 'in any case or to any degree NOT NECESSARY,
and that the party making the defense is permitted to use no instrument and no power
beyond what will prove simply effectual.'" People v. Anderson, 44 Cal. 65, 69 (1872).

IGNORANCE IN CRIMINAL LAW
perpetrated in apparently necessary self-defense, the harm is privileged."
The doctrine has expanded far beyond such primary interests as those
involved in the above cases. A railroad conductor "is justified in forcibly ejecting him [a passenger] from the car, because he, the conductor,
honestly believes that the passenger has not paid his fare, but persistently
The defense was also allowed where the defendant
refuses so to do."'
voted before he was 21, believing he was of age ;18 in charges of uttering
a forged instrument ;19 in larceny, where the defendant was mistaken as
to the denomination of the bill handed him;"0 and in many other situations."' Thus, in a very large number of cases, the criminal law seems
to be in complete accord with the purely ethical appraisal of action in
mistake of fact.
In the above cases the mistake of fact excluded the mens rea. This
raises a question concerning harms which would not have been committed
except for a mistake, but where the actor's intention was nonetheless
criminal, e.g., a mistake in the identity of the intended victim of an assault. One who inflicted a mortal wound on an intimate friend, whom
he mistook for a person who had attacked him earlier in the evening,
could derive no advantage from his error. There is an ambiguity in the
court's assertion that "he intended to kill the man at whom the knife was
directed" ;"2 but it is clear, in any event, that such a mistake is not legally
significant since the defendant intended to kill or seriously injure a human being.23 Thus, the doctrine must be qualified as follows: mistake
of fact is a defense if, because of the mistake, mens rea is lacking.2 This
qualification is quite consistent with the ethical principle represented in
ignorantiafacti excusat.
Restrictions (a) Reasonableitess of the Error
But Anglo-American criminal law restricts the scope of ignorantia
facti in ways which constitute serious limitations and, sometimes, a com16. State v. Nash, 88 N.C. 597 (1883).
17. State v. McDonald, 7 Mo. App. 510 (1879).
18. Gordon v. State, 52 Ala. 308 (1875).
19. United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611 (1881).
20. Regina v. Hehir, [1895] 2 Ir. R. 709.
21. See Perkins, supra note 3, at 54-55.
22. McGehee v. State, 62 Miss. 772, 773 (1885).
23. See also Isham v. State, 38 Ala. 213 (1862) and Queen v. Lynch, 1 Cox C.C.
361 (1846). In these cases the interest intended for destruction was of equal value to
that actually destroyed. The writer's criticism concerns the terminology employed
and the hypostatization of "general intent," "transferred intent" and the like. HALL,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 451-52 (1947).

24. In criminal attempt, the problem of impossibility concerns failure to actualize
the intention because of a mistake of fact. See id. at 117-28. But the inens rea remains

constant.
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plete repudiation of the underlying policy. These restrictions concern
(a) the requirement that the mistake be a "reasonable" one (the civilian
expression is that the ignorance be "invincible") and (b) certain sexual
offenses, bigamy and other types of strict liability.
An honest mistake of fact is not sufficient. "The apprehension of
danger must be bona fide and reasonable."2 5 Not the defendant's actual
erroneous perception of the facts, but the facts "as they reasonably appeared to him" determine whether he is criminally liable.26 After the
usual instruction to the jury that the "defendant was bound to act as a
reasonably cautious and prudent person would," a court specified that
"the excitement of the moment" (the deceased had followed the defendant's daughter and other children in a frightening manner) would
not modify this rule.2" So, too, intoxication is irrelevant, 28 and only
rarely is there even a hint that a court will permit consideration of
serious incapacities, falling short of insanity. 2 Nor is the requirement
that the mistake be reasonable confined to the perception of facts. For
example, where the defendant, charged with bigamy, mistakenly believed
his wife was dead, his opinion was based on information which was acquired and evaluated in various ways. The prevailing restrictive interpretation of the doctrine requires that the whole cognitive process function reasonably."0
The plain consequence of this application of objective liability to
ignorantiafacti is that persons who commit harms solely because they are
mistaken regarding the material facts are nonetheless criminally liable,2 '
i.e., despite the complete lack of criminal intent. Moreover, a person who
25. Hill v. State, 194 Ala. 11, 23, 69 So. 941, 946 (1915), 2 A.L.R. 509, 518 (1919).
26. Nalley v. State, 28 Tex. Ct. App. 387, 391, 13 S.W. 670, 671 (1890).
27. State v. Towne, 180 Iowa 339, 160 N.W. 10 (1916).
28.

".

.

. if the defendant by voluntarily putting himself under the influence of

liquor incapacitated himself for taking such a view of the situation as a reasonably
prudent man would have taken under the circumstances, and, in consequence thereof, he
acted upon an exaggerated or unjustifiable belief as to the necessity for taking the life
of the deceased in defense of his own, such belief could not avail him as a defense to
the charge in the indictment." Springfield v. State, 96 Ala. 81, 85-86, 11 So. 250, 252
(1892).
29. In Yates v. People, 32 N.Y. 509 (1865) the court did take account of the
defendant's "extreme infirmity of vision."
30. "No man can be acquitted of responsibility for a wrongful act, unless he employs 'the means at command to inform himself.' Not employing such means, though
he may be mistaken, he must bear the consequences of his negligence." Dotson v. State,
62 Ala. 141, 144 (1878).
31. Hill v. State, 194 Ala. 11, 69 So. 941 (1915), 2 A.L.R. 509, 518 (1919); State
v. Terrell, 55 Utah 314, 186 Pac. 108 (1919), 25 A.L.R. 497, 525 (1923). The requirement of "reasonableness" does not apply to perjury, People v. Von Tiedeman, 120 Cal.
128, 52 Pac. 155 (1898), or to the various property offenses. See note 109 infra, referring to mistakes in property law in relation to mens rea. "If they [defendants] did
so believe it is not material whether their belief was well founded or not." Lewis v.
People, 99 Colo. 102, 117, 60 P.2d 1089, 1096 (1936).
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has acted "unreasonably" seems occasionally to have been held just as
culpable as he would have been if he had actually intended to commit the
harm ;2 and we shall see that this is often done in convictions of bigamy
and sexual offenses. There are surprisingly few reports of homicide
cases which specifically discuss this question, but the indicated holding
is that a killing by the defendant in the unreasonable mistake that his life
was in danger is manslaughter." s When it is recalled that recklessness is
required in manslaughter, even those who would hold negligence properly
within the range of penal liability, i.e., as a form of mens rea, must recognize the invalidity of the above holding. For even on that premise, liability should be imposed for negligent ("unreasonable") behavior, not
for non-existent ,voluntary harm-doing. Thus the requirement that a
mistake of fact be reasonable has very drastic consequences and in this
respect the common law is harsher than civilian legal systems. 4
It is not implied that "reasonableness" serves no useful purpose in
criminal law. "Reasonableness" designates an alleged objective standard,
and it is possible to question its significance, e.g., can it mean anything
more than the opinion of each individual? It may be here assumed that
the standard is meaningful in the accepted sense, just as "normality"
and "due care" may be assumed to have meanings which are defensible
and useful. The present point is that "reasonableness"-the objective
standard-serves two principal functions in law. One of these is that
discussed above-a standard of liability-and the writer has long urged
the elimination of that from the criminal law wherever possible. 5 The
other function, however, is an essential one in every branch of law,
namely, to guide inquiry regarding any person's actual state of mind.
In the absence of any showing that the defendant is insane, feeble-minded,
intoxicated, inexperienced, etc., his normality is assumed. But since no
one can have direct acquaintance with the mental state of any other
person, the determination of that requires, first, a determination of
"reasonable" mental functioning and then, no question being raised regarding any abnormality, the defensible attribution of the mental state,
32. In Regina v. Rose, 15 Cox C.C. 540 (1884), the judge's instruction indicated
that a verdict of murder could be returned against the defendant who unreasonably
believed he was preventing a homicide. A.R.N.Cross suggests that this would now
be manslaughter. 51 LAw Soc'Y GAZ. 515 (1954). Cf. Miles v. State, 52 Tex. Crim.

561, 108 S.W. 378 (1908).
33. Allison v. State, 74 Ark. 444, 86 S.W. 409, 413 (1904) ; State v. Thomas, 184
N.C. 757, 761-62, 114 S.E. 834, 836 (1922) ; State v. Doherty, 72 Vt. 381, 48 Atl. 658
(1900) ; State v. Sorrentino, 31 Wyo. 129, 224 Pac. 420, 424 (1924).

34. E.g., Art. 19 of the Swiss Federal Penal Code provides: "If the offender had

been able to avoid the error by acting with due caution, he shall be punished for negligence, provided that the negligent commission of the act is punishable." Translation,
30 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. Sup,. 22 (1939).
35. HALL, op. cit. szpra note 23, c. 6. Cf. infra pp. 21-23.
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thus determined, to the particular defendant. This meaning of "reasonableness," as an essential instrument of inquiry, must be sharply distinguished from its application as an external standard of criminal liability
represented in the substantive law on mistake of fact. It is the latter
which is objectionable because some defendants are inexperienced or
awkward or, for other causes, are not reasonable ("normal") persons;
nor, on the other hand, do they fall within the definition of legally
recognized incompetence."6
Negligent behavior implies inadvertence regarding the harm caused;
while in action in ignorance of the facts, the actor "intended" to inflict a harm which, however, he would not have done had he not been
mistaken. Thus, it is the defendant's capacity (to know and to act with
due care) which is the salient common element.
Invincible Ignorance
The defendant's capacity to acquire necessary knowledge is discussed in European law in terms of whether his ignorance was "vincible"
or "invincible" ;"7 and this has resulted in more searching inquiry than is
customary with reference to "reasonableness." Aristotle, from whom
that notion stems, attached culpability to harms committed "in ignorance," but he absolved the doer if the harm was done not only "in ignorance" but also "through ignorance.""
The former is "vincible"
ignorance, the latter, "invincible," i.e., the doer was competent to acquire
the necessary knowledge or he lacked that ability." As regards the latter,
Aristotle's position is more discriminating than the common law which
holds that if a person is sane, he is conclusively presumed to have the
necessary capacity. If that presumption is rejected, e.g., there are persons
who, although sane, are so handicapped in certain respects that they lack
normal skill" or knowledge, it follows that such persons are not morally
culpable for harms resulting from their lack of competence and that they
should not be held criminally liable.
Aristotle, however, had still another test to apply to such persons
before he would exculpate them. With regard to persons who were invincibly ignorant or inefficient when they committed certain harms, i.e.,
36. E.g., Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946).
37. See supra note 1.
38. ETHICA NIcHOMACHEA, bk. 111.5, 1113b-1114a; bk. V.8, 1136a, 5-10 (Ross
transl, 1925) ; MAGNA MORALIA bk. 1.33, 1195a, 28-32 (Ross transl. 1915).
39. Cf. ". . . there is an ignorance that is superable, and that is no excuse; and
there is an ignorance that is insuperable, and that is an excuse, whether it arises from
nature, as from excessive age, or from a malady such as madness." The Mirror of
Justices 138 (Seld. Soc'y ed. 1893).
40. See Yates v. People, 32 N.Y. 509 (1865).
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they could not have done better at that time, Aristotle maintained that
some of them might nevertheless be found culpable by reference to their
past. While holding that morality concerns only voluntary conduct, he
took an extremely rigorous position in this regard. He specifies an intoxicated person who cannot function properly and he finds him culpable
on the ground that he need not have become intoxicated. In the past he
"willed" in certain respects, which led to the habit of indulgence. According to Aristotle, moral culpability may be posited in such cases on
the voluntary actions performed or omitted in the past which had the
cumulative effect of incapacitation.
But there are serious difficulties with this subtle ethics as regards its
application to criminal law. In order to implement that position, it would
be necessary to survey the entire course of the defendant's life, to decide,
e.g., whether one who was not competent to drive an automoblie with due
care had deliberately refrained from bicycle-riding, chosen not to learn
about machinery, etc., including all his overt acts that had any bearing
on the incompetence which now makes his lack of skill or ignorance invincible. If the driver were a woman who could not gauge a distance or
the angle of a curve, it would be necessary to decide whether her present
ignorance was determined by her own culpable acts and omissions or was
always invincible. Thus, while there is no escape from the sheer logic
of the Aristotelian thesis and some may also find much merit in his
ethics, the factual difficulties are so considerable as to preclude their use
in criminal law. Here it is not only a question of ethical principle; the
punishment of human beings within the limits and limitations of a legal
system is also involved. Can any child or youth foresee that a series of
petty transgressions may lead years in the future to a condition of ignorance or inefficiency that produces serious harms? Is there any feasible
basis to impute present criminal liability for harms caused by voluntary
lapses in the distant past? Accordingly, one would wish to delegate that
kind of adjudication to an omniscient philosopher-king who had precise
records and the wisdom to assess culpability for a major harm caused
many years later by minor actions that were completely unrelated, in
human prescience, to any serious consequences.
On the other hand, if an historical inquiry, a "case-history," is limited
to the determination of the defendant's present competence, it is feasible
to apply at least certain phases of it to criminal liability. For example, as
will be seen later with reference to ignorantiajuris, if illness or absence
from the country made it impossible to acquire necessary information,
that should be a defense. But while it will be generally agreed that such
invincible ignorance should bar penal liability, it by no means follows
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that vincible ignorance should incur it. For vincible ignorance may imply mere negligence ("unreasonableness").
For the purposes of ethical inquiry, persons who have the competence to acquire necessary information and fail to do that may be deemed
culpable. But, it is submitted, if only voluntary harm-doing merits the
severe blame implied in penal liability, it cannot be shown that either
negligent behavior or the commission of a harm in ignorance of material
facts is culpable in that degree or in that sense.41 For there is a great
difference between asserting that a person must voluntarily commit a
certain harm to be sufficiently culpable to merit penal sanctions and asserting that he is thus culpable if he could have prevented himself from
involuntarily causing a harm. So, too, those who support the present
limitation of "reasonableness" on ignorantiafacti might find it difficult
to prove that a person who had the capacity to acquire adequate knowledge or to use due care is culpable in the above degree and sense even
though he acted in the absence of such knowledge and skill.
Much of the discussion of negligent and uninformed behavior by
modern writers on ethics becomes tangled in the quagmires of an ambiguous syllogism that is silent at the crucial point. Thus it is said: If
the actor had wanted to, or if he had thought of it, he could have performed the act properly. But voluntary harm-doing, i.e., in the knowledge
of at least the risk of that, is quite different from a lack of sensitivity
to the risk of injuring others or to the need for knowledge of the likelihood of doing that. Thus, it is not logical to assert that because a person is competent to do an act properly if he thinks about it, therefore he
is culpable for doing harm inadvertently. If the argument is restated to base culpability upon insensitivity (incapacity) regarding the
need for knowledge, it must also be rejected on the ground that what is
required to support the kind or degree of moral condemnation characteristic of, and defensible in, modern penal law is voluntary action-at least
reckless conduct. The chief conclusion to be drawn from the above
analysis is that action in ignorance of material facts, where no more than
negligence is shown, should not incur penal liability. But if the judg41. Cf. "If an Action be done without any malicious design, and not with Ignorance voluntarily contracted, but such only as crept in by Inconsideration and Inadvertency, the Imputation is not altogether taken away, yet it is considerably diminished. Hither we may refer the Case propos'd by Aristotle of a Woman that gave a
Love-Potion to her Gallant of which he died. Now the Athenian Judges absolv'd the
'Woman from this Indictment, because she did the Fact undesignedly, and only miss'd
the Effect of her Potion, and procur'd his Death instead of his Love, which was her
only Aim. But to make this Sentence equitable, it must have been suppos'd as a
Principle, that the Woman never so much as thought the Potion she administered was
any way hurtful." PUFENDORF, OF THE LAWS OF NATURE AND OF NATIONS, bk. I, c. V,
at 40 (1703).
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ment proceeds from a finding of unreasonableness or vincibility to one of
penal liability, it does not take account of the crucial difference between
negligence and recklessness. Although the incompetence or ignorance
may have been vincible or unreasonable, it does not follow that the harm
in issue was committed voluntarily.
Harms resulting from inadvertence or ignorance signify incompetence and inefficiency rather than the voluntary misconduct that is the
concern of penal law. Or, at most, those phases of such harms that are
believed to connote fault are not of the grosser type of culpability that
falls within the proper range of penal law. Moreover, as regards deterrence, it must be observed that efficiency and competence are not increased by punishment.2 This does not imply that the community
should not be protected from dangerous inefficiency or ignorance. If
we look about us for measures more likely than punitive ones to secure
the required kind of protection, recent advances in the vocational training of handicapped persons, supervision, and revocation of licenses seem
promising. The elimination of "reasonableness" as a substantive restriction of the doctrine of ignorantiafacti would clarify the public mind regarding the nature of criminal conduct. It would facilitate analysis of
the criminal law and stimulate a sounder administration of it.
Restrictions (b) Strict Liability
The strict liability imposed for public welfare offenses4 3 excludes
any consideration of mistake of fact even though the mistake was one
which any reasonable person would have made. Thus, as regards many
serious offenses, only "reasonable" mistakes exculpate-and we have
seen the arbitrary import of that as it affects honestly mistaken harmdoers; and, as regards a large number of minor offenses, even a reasonable mistake of fact is no defense.44 This strict liability has also been
applied to various major crimes, especially sexual offenses.
42. There is considerable psychological literature indicating that punishment has
little influence on learning.

See, e.g., THORNDIKE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF

WANTS,

IN-

AND ATTITUDES 149-52 (1935), and Estes, Ant Experimnental Study of Punishment, 57 PSYCH. MONOG. No. 3, 1 (1944). Practically all the data relied upon concern
the acquisition of various skills and not of moral sensitivity. Hence the conclusions
reached in such studies do not affect the function of punishment where the offender has committed morally culpable acts.
43. HALL, op. cit. supra note 23, c. 10.
44. Ibid. In Regina v. Bishop, 14 Cox C.C. 404 (1880), where the defendant was
convicted of receiving a "lunatic" into her house, such house not being an asylum, it
was held no defense that there was an honest belief that the person received was not a
lunatic.
TERESTS
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A leading illustrative case is Regina v. Prince,45 where the defendant
was charged with having taken an unmarried girl, under 16, from the
possession and against the will of her father. The jury found that the
girl told the defendant she was 18, that he believed her and that his belief
was a reasonable one, i.e., all the usual requirements of exculpation on the
ground of reasonable mistake of a material fact were met. Nonetheless,
of the ten judges all but one upheld the conviction. Two theories were
relied on: the legislature intended to exclude nens rea; and the defendant's conduct was immoral regardless of the girl's age, hence the
mistake of that fact was irrelevant.
The first ground was persuasively challenged by Brett, J., in a detailed historical survey of the legislation. In the light of that, it Is clear
that the judges' own view of the relevant policy determined "the legislative intent." As regards the second ground, the judges' chief reliance
was upon analogy from the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule. Brett, J.,
supported that rule46 but refused to expand the analogy to the point accepted by the majority, namely, that the required mens rea could be
posited on immoral conduct that was not illegal." From convictions in
cases of assault and illegal entry into a dwelling house, where the mistakes of fact were irrelevant because the intentions were nonetheless
criminal, Bramwell, J., induced the wide ratio that liability could be
supported on the ground that "the act [intended]

. . . was wrong in

itself."48
With reference to the strict liability imposed,4 9 it should be noted
that no evidence supporting the assumed need for such arbitrariness is
available. In these circumstances, one may certainly believe that application of the usual restriction of ignorantiafacti to reasonable mistakes
would result in convictions in the vast majority of such cases. Even
without that unjustifiable limitation on the doctrine, judges and juries
would not easily be persuaded that the defendants in such cases actually
believed the girls were above the statutory age. Moreover, since recklessness is sufficient to support penal liability, it would be necessary only
45. 13 Cox C.C. 138 (1875). The earlier English cases are there cited. Similar
decisions in this country are: People v. Dolan, 96 Cal. 315, 31 Pac. 107 (1892);
Heath v. State, 173 Ind. 296, 90 N.E. 310 (1909) ; State v. Ruhl, 8 Iowa 447 (1859)
People v. Marks, 146 App. Div. 11, 130 N.Y. Supp. 524 (1st Dep't 1911).
46. Regina v. Prince, 13 Cox C.C. 138, 155-56 (1875).
47. "I do not say illegal, but wrong." Id. at 141.
48. Id. at 143. Cf. "And though the wrong intended was even not indictable, the
defendant would still be liable, . . . ." State v. Ruhl, 8 Iowa 447, 450 (1859).
49. Rex v. Maughan, 24 Cr. App. R. 130 (1934).
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to find that the defendant was in doubt regarding the material facts. 50
52
5
In addition to various sexual offenses, bigamy and adultery,
strict liability, based on the exclusion of even reasonable mistakes of fact
from the doctrine of ignorantiafacti, has been applied to embezzlement,
the sale of narcotics and in cases of persons defending others against
apparent serious aggression.5" Heavy penalties are imposed in such
cases. Thus strict penal liability has swept over a vast terrain in the
past century,5 and the conclusions reached above in the context of mistake of fact support that emphasized elsewhere : this branch of our law
is so thoroughly disorganized, rests so largely on conjecture and dubious
psychology, and effects such gross injustice as to require major reform.

Mention must be made, finally, of a type of factual ignorance which
is not usually discussed in relation to ignorantiafacti, namely, ignorance
of elementary science, e.g., regarding sickness, medicine and the use of
physicians. The defendants in these cases are sometimes very stupid
persons, unaware of the gravity of a child's illness and the availability
In other cases the defendants are members of religious
of physicians.5
sects which believe, e.g., that the devout cannot be harmed even by the bite
of a rattlesnake" or that it is sinful to use medicine. There are surprisingly few reports of such cases, apparently because prosecutors are
reluctant to initiate proceedings and, when they do, juries are apt to
acquit.55 But there have been a number of convictions, and the relevant
holdings imply that ignorance of ordinary factual knowledge, possessed
by every "normal" adult in the community except such eccentrics as
these defendants, is no defense. Although mitigation is undoubtedly
frequent, it is assumed that the ignorance was "unreasonable," and the
50.

"Consequently, doubt is not error, nor is suspension of judgment, for in such

experiences there is no conviction that we now know." Aron, op. cit. supra note 8, at
57 n. 1.
51. See infra pp. 30-34.
52. State v. Anderson, 140 Iowa 445, 118 N.W. 772 (1908); Commonwealth v.
Eiwell, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 190 (1840).
53. State v. Cook, 78 S.C. 253, 59 S.E. 862 (1907), 15 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1013 (1908).
54. But cf. The English Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c.
56, § 2, which provides: "Reasonable cause to believe that a girl was of or above the age
of sixteen years shall not be a defence to a charge under section five . . . of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885. . . . Provided that in the case of a man of
twenty-three years of age or under the presence of reasonable cause to believe that the
girl was over the age of sixteen years shall be a valid defence on the first occasion
on which he is charged with an offense under this section."
55. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRImINAL LAW, C. 10 (1947).
56. Stehr v. State, 92 Nebr. 755, 139 N.W. 676 (1913).
57. Kirk v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 839, 44 S.E.2d 409 (1947).
58. Larson, Child Neglect in the Exercise of Religious Freedomn, 32 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 283 (1954).
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conduct is held criminal.

Such decisions raise difficult questions regard-

ing the application of objective mens rea59 and the quality of legal justice.
IGNORANTIA JURIS NEMINEM EXCUSAT

Fact and Law
In current discussions of criminal law theory, it is sometimes argued
that ignorantiajuris neminem excusat is an archaism that should be discarded. This doctrine seems to hold morally innocent persons criminally
liable, and to do so in reliance upon an obvious fiction-that everyone is
presumed to know the law. But if the meaning of ignorantia juris differs greatly from that of ignorantiafacti, their respective functions should
also be very different. The first step toward solution of this problem is
to analyze the terms that distinguish the two doctrines.
Certain differences between fact and law are easily recognized. Law
is expressed in distinctive propositions, whereas facts are qualities or
events occurring at definite places and times. Facts are particulars directly sensed in perception and introspection. Legal rules are generalizations; they are not sensed, but are understood in the process of cognition."0 Law and fact are, of course, closely interrelated-law is "about"
facts, it gives distinctive meaning to facts. For example, that A kills B
is a fact; that this is murder is signified by certain legal propositions."'
When practical questions must be decided, what is "fact" and what is
"law" differ in various contexts, e.g., if the purpose is to determine the
respective functions of judge and jury or if a question of foreign law
is in issue.
Although the terms of the doctrines concerning ignorantia indicate that it is important to make the above distinctions, it will be seen
later that the crucial difference is not between fact and law, but between
what is and what is not morally significant. Indeed, we have already
seen that fact is subordinated to a mistaken belief about fact, i.e., to what
is relevant to morality. Again, the distinction of property and other nonpenal law from penal law and treating the former as "fact," to be discussed
later in relation to property crimes and bigamy, will also be seen to
59.

See infra pp. 21-23.

60. It is important to distinguish this meaning of "law" from its equally important
sociological meaning, where it denotes a type of social fact, i.e., it is viewed as an external "thing" which influences behavior. This would fit the following definition of
"fact": "No one doubts that there are coercive factors in general experience which
certainly determine action, and also in some degree determine thought and will, though
to an extent which is disputable. These existences, science, like common sense, calls
facts." BARRY, THE SCIENTIFIc HABIT OF THOUGHT 93 (1927). Cf. HALL, LIvING LAW
oF DEM'OCRATIC SOcIETY c. 3 (1949).

61.

See Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, 50 L.Q. REv. 474, 478 (1935).
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support the hypothesis that the two doctrines move in different directions
because they function differently in relation to the moral significance
of criminal law. But we must first relate the distinctions drawn above
regarding law and fact to ignorantia.
"Ignorantia!"
Of the various sources of difficulty encountered in analysis of
ignorantiajuris, the most serious one concerns the meaning of "ignorantia." Since that term suggests a negative condition, i.e., the absence of
"knowledge," analysis of this problem must deal with the latter term. It
may be inferred from the distinctions drawn above between fact and law,
that perception is a primitive form of knowledge, and that knowledge of
law, the cognition of legal propositions, is much more complex. More
important is that perception of facts is relatively certain; given external
objects, all normal persons who perceive them under "adequate" conditions arrive at uniform judgments, and errors are attributed to excitement, negligence, poor conditions of observation, intoxication, and the
like. But with reference to knowledge of law, there can never be such
certainty as that. Although it is true that one is sometimes just as certain that a particular situation is within a rule as he is that he sees an
exernal object, much more is required to determine the meaning of the
rule. To do that one must take account of the vagueness of legal rules
at their periphery, the unavoidable attribute of all propositions that refer
to facts. Hence, no one can say with certainty that a rule of law means
precisely thus and so.
These differences regarding knowledge of law and knowledge of
fact indicate that ignwrantiafacti is an apt expression because "mistake"
implies the possibility of certitude but that ignorantiajuris is not apt. In
any case, whatever view of the two kinds of knowledge or ignorantia is
preferred, the relatively much greater difficulty of knowing the law suggests that the two doctrines may implement very different policies. This
preliminary insight into the nature of legal knowledge provides a perspective from which to gauge the significance of various theories of
ignorantiajuris.
Earlier Theories
The Roman theory-that the law is "definite and knowable"" 2seems to have been interpreted quite literally. As Blackstone noted,
"every person of discretion . . . may . . . know" it ;"3 hence ignorance
62. 1 AUSTIN, LEcTuRs ON JURISPRUDENCE 497 (4th ed. 1879).
op. cit. supra note 41, bk. 1, c. 3, at 10.
63. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *27.

See

PUFENDORF,
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is culpable. It is stated by many writers that the rigor of the Roman
doctrine, unlike Blackstone's version, was relieved by the exception of
large classes of persons (minors, women, farmers and soldiers) from its
operation.64 But whatever may have been its original persuasiveness in
small communities, this theory seems so far-fetched in modern conditions
as to be quixotic. Its rationale must be found in a policy that can be
justified otherwise than by mere reference to a fiction.
A modern theory, constructed with due appreciation of this, was
presented by Austin who maintained that it rested on, and was required
by, the impossibility of determining the relevant issue. "Whether the
party was really ignorant of the law, and was so ignorant of the law that
he had no surmise of its provisions, could scarcely be determined by any
evidence accessible to others."65 He also pointed out that even if the
above problem were solved, it would be impossible to determine whether
the defendant had been negligent in failing to acquire the legal knowledge
since it would be "incumbent upon the tribunal to unravel his previous
history, and to search his whole life for the elements of a just solution."66
Austin's theory was rejected by Holmes who "doubted whether a
man's knowledge of the law is any harder to investigate than many questions which are gone into. The difficulty, such as it is, would be met by
throwing the burden of proving ignorance on the law breaker."67 Unfortunately, Holmes did not discuss Austin's claim that the determination
of parallel questions regarding fact was quite different and "soluble,"
that they "may be solved by looking at the circumstances of the case. The
inquiry is limited to a given incident . . . and is, therefore, not interminable."68 His own theory was that ignorantia juris neminem excusat was merely a phase of objective liability required by social utility:
"to admit the excuse at all would be to encourage ignorance where the
law-maker has determined to make men know and obey .... "6
Austin's theory of ignorantia juris, it is submitted, has much to
recommend it. If, e.g., a defendant claimed that he believed he had a
right to kill a trespasser, how could his testimony be disproved? How
could the prosecution establish that he actually believed he had no such
legal right ?7" To hold, as did Holmes, that the difficulty could be met
64. This general opinion was rejected by Binding, who limited the exceptional
treatment to civil law. Ryu and Silving, Error Juris-A Comparative Study, 24 U. OF
CHI. L. REv. 421, 425 (1957).
65. AUSTIN, op. cit. supra note 62, at 498.
66. Id. at 499.
67. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 48 (1881).
68. AusTiN, op. cit. supra note 62, at 499.
69. HOLMES, op. cit. supra note 67.
70. See Gordon v. State, 52 Ala. 308 (1875).
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by placing the burden of proof upon the defendant does not meet Austin's
position. If ignorance of the law is unprovable,' how is the nature of
that negative issue changed by requiring the defendant to establish his
ignorance, i.e., by a technical rule of procedure? Thus, it must be concluded that, if his position is literally interpreted, Austin stood on firm
ground.7 In addition, Austin's doubts regarding proof of negligence
are certainly warranted.
On the other hand, however, it must be recognized that it is possible
to prove that a person had an opportunity to acquire certain knowledge
or per contra, that due, e.g., to illness, his ignorance in the above "operational" sense, was invincible. Thus, it might be shown that certain information had been brought to the defendant's attention, e.g., that he was
handed a booklet containing certain laws, that an administrative board
mailed him a set of regulations, or that -certain rules governing his vocation were published in a newspaper to which he subscribed. From such
facts, it might be presumed that he read the law in question; it might
also be inferred that, being a normal adult, he -understood it or enough
of it to satisfy a relevant mevns rea. But for reasons to be discussed below,
the defense of invincible ignorance of the law, since it proceeds on the
premise that knowledge of law is material, can have only a limited application, i.e., to certain petty offenses.
It is significant that both Austin and Holmes,7 2 while they differed
regarding the practical implementation of a defense of ignorance of the
law, shared a common utilitarian viewpoint which, in addition, did not
distinguished major crimes from petty offenses. Holmes's thesis, that
to allow the defense would "encourage ignorance where the law-maker
has determined to make men know and obey," is surely questionable.
For this implies that knowledge of the penal law is material, whereas
such knowledge is usually irrelevant. Moreover, it can hardly be established that a principal purpose of penal law is to stimulate legal education; even Bentham balked at punishment as a method of making the law
known.7 3 In Holmes' theory, if a defendant who, e.g., had shot his wife's
paramour in adultery, could show that he had studied the criminal law
long and assiduously before doing that, he should be entitled at least to
71. Cf. "But the proof of a belief in the existence of private rights, such as
ownership, can-be found in objective evidence of conduct, while belief in the existence
of a general law generally would have no such objective manifestations." Note, 45

HARV. L. REV. 336, n. 19 (2) (1931).
(1943).

See Winfield, Mistake of Law, 59 L.Q. REV. 327

72. Holmes' theory has been accepted by

§ 115 at 385 (1953).
73. 6
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mitigation of the punishment.74 But no one has ever sought mitigation
on that ground; indeed, it would warrant aggravation of the punishment
since the mens rea had long been entertained. This indicates that penal
policy is not to make men know the law, as such, but to help them inhibit
harmful conduct." The influence of penal law results not from men's
learning criminal law as amateur lawyers, but from the significance of
the public condemnation of, and imposition of punishment for, certain
highly immoral acts. Thus, despite a lawyer's predilection, there is not
the slightest evidence that the generality of men study the criminal law
in order "to know and obey it." The deterrent theory here, again, reflects an over-simple, intellectualistic psychology that hardly comes into
contact with the actual springs of moral conduct and conformity with
penal law.
As was suggested above, neither Austin's nor Holmes' theory cuts
to the heart of the problem of ignorantiajuris. The universality of the
doctrine"6 alone suggests that it rests on extremely important, positive
grounds. The frequent expression of the necessity of reliance upon it,
of the dependence of any administration of justice upon it, and the like 7
also indicate that the doctrine is grounded in a more fundamental rationale than was expressed by either Austin or the Holmes of The Common Law.
The Rationale of Ignorantia Juris
A defensible theory of ignorantiajuris must, it is suggested, find its
origin in the central fact noted above, namely, that the meaning of the
rules of substantive penal law is unavoidably vague, the degree of
vagueness increasing as one proceeds from the core of the rules to their
periphery. It is therefore possible to disagree indefinitely regarding the
meaning of these words. But in adjudication, such indefinite disputa74. Cf. Holmes, J.,: "It may be assumed that he intended not to break the
law . . . but if the conduct described crossed the line, the fact that he desired to keep
within it will not help him. It means only that he misconceived the law." Horning v.
District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 137 (1920).
75. Also cf. "If he knew that his representations were false, and if he intended to
deceive by them, and, by the help of the motives thus created, to get Kearns' property, he
had the only criminal intent which the statute requires." Holmes, J., in Commonwealth
v. O'Brien, 172 Mass. 248, 256, 52 N.E. 77, 80 (1898).
76. See RADULEScO, DE L'INFLUENCE DE L'ERREUR SUR LA RksPoNSrBILITt

PANALE 15-17 (1923).
77. "Without it justice could not be administered." 1

BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW

197

(9th ed. 1923); People v. O'Brien, 96 Cal. 171, 176, 31 Pac. 45, 47 (1892). The like
views of Ortolan, Laborde, Garcon and Garraud are summarized by RADULESCO, op Cit.
supra note 76, at 41-43. "That ignorance of law does not exempt from obligation is a
principle which prevails in all legal orders and which must prevail, since, otherwise, it
would be almost impossible to apply the legal order." KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF
LAW AND STATE 72 (1945).
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tion is barred because that is opposed to the character and requirements
of a legal order, as is implied in the principle of legality. Accordingly, a
basic axiom of legal semantics is that legal rules do or do not include
certain behavior; and the linguistic problem must be definitely solved
one way or the other, on that premise. These characteristics of legal
adjudication imply a degree of necessary reliance upon authority. The
debate must end and the court must decide one way or the other within
a reasonable time. The various needs are met by prescribing a rational
procedure and acceptance of the decisions of the "competent" officials as
authoritative. Such official declaration of the meaning of a law is what
the law is, however circuitously that is determined.
Now comes a defendant who truthfully pleads that he did not know
that his conduct was criminal, implying that he thought it was legal.
This may be because he did not know that any relevant legal prohibition
existed (ignorance) or, if he did know any potentially relevant rule, that
he decided it did not include his intended situation or conduct (mistake).
In either case, such defenses always imply that the defendant thought he
was acting legally. If that plea were valid, the consequence would be:
whenever a defendant in a criminal case thought the law was thus and
so, he is to be treated as though the law were thus and so, i.e., the law
actually is thus and so. But such a doctrine would contradict the essential
requisites of a legal system, the implications of the principle of legality.
This is apparent when we examine some necessary elements of a legal
order, signified by the principle of legality (the "rule of law"), in greater
detail. These are:
(1) that rules of law express objective meanings;
(2) that certain persons (the authorized "competent" officials)
shall, after a prescribed procedure, declare what those meanings are.
They shall say, e.g., that situations A, B, C but not X, Y, Z are included
within certain rules; and
(3)
that these, and only these, interpretations are binding, i.e., only
these meanings of the rules are the law.
To permit an individual to plead successfully that he had a different
opinion or interpretation of the law would contradict the above postulates
of a legal order. For there is a basic incompatibility between asserting
that the law is what certain officials declare it to be after a prescribed
analysis, and asserting, also, that those officials must declare it to be, i.e.,
that the law is, what defendants or their lawyers believed it to be. A
legal order implies the rejection of such contradiction. It opposes objectivity to subjectivity, judicial process to individual opinion, official to
lay, and authoritative to non-authoritative declarations of what the law
is. This is the rationale of ignorantiajuris neminem excusat.
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This rationale can also be expressed in terms of the ethical policy of
ignorantiajuris neminem excusat, namely, that the criminal law represents certain moral principles; to recognize ignorance or mistake of the
law as a defense would contradict those values."
Reference to the criminal cases where a defense of ignorance was
pleaded supports this insight. A plea of ignorance or mistake of law is
rarely encountered in prosecutions for serious crimes; it is raised almost
solely in relation to minor offenses. Thus no sane defendant has pleaded
ignorance that the law forbids killing a human being or forced intercourse or taking another's property or burning another person's house.
In such cases, which include the common law felonies and the more
serious misdemeanors, instead of asserting that knowledge of law is presumed, it would be much more to the point to assert that knowledge of
law (equally, ignorance or mistake of law) is wholly irrelevant. But
many have and do plead ignorance of laws requiring them to supply certain reports or forbidding the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquor,
the possession of gambling appliances, conducting a lottery, betting on
horse races, keeping a saloon open on election day, and the like." In the
relatively few cases of major crimes where ignorance of law was pleaded,
no challenge was raised concerning the validity of the moral principle
generally implied, but it was claimed that the situation in which the defendant acted was "exceptional." Thus, in a murder case, the defendant
sought to justify his action on the ground that his victim was a wilful
trespasser ;8 in another homicide, on the ground that he was protecting
his sister from one who was attempting to drug her to facilitate her
rape."' There are kidnapping cases, defended by police officers, where
suspected offenders were held incommunicado under a claim that the
penal law permitted such conduct."2 But none of the above defendants
alleged that he was ignorant that the criminal law forbade murder or
kidnapping. This problem is closely related to the valuation of harms
in the criminal law, expressed in the principle of mens rea.
78. The same considerations do not apply to ignorantia facti because: (a) Such a
mistake is particular, i.e., it concerns a unique experience which in no way opposes the
meaning of rules of law. These meanings are generalizations; they can be and are
fitted to mistakes of fact, while, as seen, a plea of mistake of law challenges the
meaning of the rules. (b) Behavior in ignorance of the facts is "involuntary"; it is
not immoral while at least action violative of a major criminal law is immoral regardless of ignorance of the law.
79. See Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 88 U. OF PA. L. REV. 35,
36-37 (1939) and see notes 150 and 151 infra.
80. Weston v. Commonwealth, 111 Pa. 251, 2 Atl. 191 (1885).
81. People v. Cook, 39 Mich. 236 (1878).
82. People v. Weiss, 276 N.Y. 384, 12 N.E.2d 514 (1938).
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Mens Rea: The Objective Ethics of Penal Law
The criminal law represents an objective ethics which must sometimes oppose individual convictions of right.8" Accordingly, it will not
permit a defendant to plead, in effect, that although he knew what the
facts were, his moral judgment was different from that represented in
the penal law. Modern penal law goes far toward mitigating the penalty
in cases of extreme temptation or unselfish motivation. But there is a
basic limitation expressed in the fact that the consequence is mitigation,
not exculpation. In short, the value-judgments embodied in the penal
law imply that any conduct, however well motivated, that falls within
its orbit is wrong. This axiom of the penal law is a necessary one. On
practical grounds alone, serious difficulties would beset any other position, especially that mens rea should be restricted to mean that the defendant also knew he was acting immorally, i.e., against his conscience.
The claim of good motives would not only be very frequent, since rationalization is a commonplace; it would also raise problems analogous to
those discussed above in connection with the official declaration of law.
Nor could the defendant's claim that he believed he was doing what was
right be met by the rejection of his morals and the substitution of the
judge's, since the latter's morals are not to be presumed to have greater
validity because he is an official. The only defensible alternative is to
apply the established ethical judgments of the community; and the only
relatively certain data evidencing them are the penal laws.
The moral values represented in the criminal law can be defended
on the basis of their derivation from a long historical experience and
critical open discussion in which many persons, lay and expert, participated. They may not validly be contrasted with individual ethics because the individual participates in the determination and development
of the community's ethics, hence these are, also, his ethics.84 The need
for efficacy and the practical limitations of a legal apparatus tend to
restrict the penal law to conduct that is plainly immoral and widely disapproved. The process of legislation, viewed broadly to include discussion by the electorate, provides additional assurance that the legal valuations are soundly established.85 Thus, as regards the homicide of a wilful trespasser or of a spouse's paramour in adultery, it is clear that the
defendant, though he may have acted in accordance with honest conviction, was mistaken in his moral judgment. Indeed, his action and judg83.
84.

op. cit. supra note 55 at 159-61. Cf. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 82 (1924).
See Gurvitch, Is the Antithesis of "Moral Man" and "Immoral Society" True?,
HALL,

52 PmILos. Rav. 533 (1943).
85. Special considerations relevant to petty offenses are discussed infra pp. 34-39.
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ment were undoubtedly influenced by his emotional disturbance; hence
the probability is that he would, himself, take another view of his action
if he considered the situation calmly. In sum, mens rea involves objective
evaluations rather than individual ones; but inasmuch as normal persons
share common attitudes regarding the elementary interests protected by
the criminal law, it is a fair inference that the doer of a proscribed harm
knows that his conduct is immoral. Thus, while a person who acts in
accordance with his honest convictions is certainly not as culpable as one
who commits a harm knowing it is wrong, it is also true that conscience
sometimes leads one astray."6 Mens rea underlines the essential difference. Penal liability based on it implies the objective wrongness of the
harms proscribed-regardless of motive or conviction. This may fall
short of perfect justice, but the ethics of a legal order must be objective.
This is further shown in the operation of the principle of legality.
As is widely believed, the principle of legality functions as a limitation
on the authority of officials 7 and, thus, as a major protection of the individual. This aspect of the "rule of law" has been emphasized in political and legal literature on the subject. But, as a necessary corollary,
the shield has its other side-certain conduct definitely does fall within
the rules and is punishable. This often predominates in the popular
view as the primary function of the criminal law-to locate and take
control of certain harm-doers. These functions of the criminal law are
interrelated and inseparable; neither can be modified without affecting
the other. If a crime were defined in vague terms (its validity being
assumed) it would be easier to bring harm-doers and "anti-social" persons within its scope and under the State's control; but the protection
of individuals, now assured by precise case-law implementation of legality, would also suffer proportionately.
A sharply defined concept definitely excludes everything except the
class it definitely includes; but if the concept is confused by setting up
incompatible criteria, its vitality to carry out both functions becomes
weakened. For example, if it were to be enacted that a good motive for
committing an otherwise legally forbidden harm was henceforth to be a
defense, the result would be to introduce such uncertainty into the present
definitions of crimes that legality would be practically abandoned. It is
true, of course, that there is a constant tension between the existing legal
definitions and marginal cases which have wide appeal to one's sympathy, and that problems now allocated to administrative discretion may
86. "If to act in accordance with one's conviction is always,.in one sense, to do one's
duty, it remains true that one's conscience may be very much mistaken and in need of
improvement." Ross, FoUNDATIONS OF ETHICS 165 (1939).
87. See HALL, op. cit. supra note 55, c. 2.
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in the future be incorporated into the criminal law, as, e.g., has occurred
in England with reference to infanticide immediately following birth.
But there is a method of making such progress which centers in the
specification of criteria that are compatible with the rules and doctrines
of the existing law. The survival of the principle of legality requires
the preservation of the definiteness of the rules, which must not be dissolved by the incompatible recognition of the opinions of litigants and
lawyers as authoritative.
There are, thus, two aspects of the rationale of ignorantia juris
neminem excusat. The doctrine is an essential postulate of a legal order,
a phase. of the "rule of law." And, second, legality cannot be separated
from morality in a sound system of penal law. In such a system, at
least the penal law on the major crimes represents both the formal
criteria of legality and sound values. It follows that the two theories
discussed above, (1) that the principle of legality implies the doctrine of ignorantiajuris, and (2) that the doctrine is necessary to the
maintenance of the objective morality of the community, can be combined
in a single rationale-the legally expressed values may not be ignored or
contradicted. Thus, the direction of reform of the doctrine is also indicated, e.g., to take account of ignorance or mistake of property laws, other
technical rules and certain petty penal laws. This will be discussed later.
With reference to the position presented above, it is possible, of
course, to challenge the underlying premise-the desirability of having a
legal system. Some may prefer decision by individuals who exercise
completely unfettered power; and occasionally cases arise regarding
which almost everyone wishes a decision could be rendered without restriction by existing laws. But this issue need not be discussed here. 8
For present purposes it is necessary to assume the existence of a legal system and the consequent implications of the principle of legality. The
validity of the above theory of ignorantiajuris neminem excusat must be
tested by criteria which are relevant to that basic premise.
Application of the Rationale of Ignorantia Juris
In light of the above discussion we may consider certain problems
raised in the literature and case-law on ignorantiajuris. Two proposed
exceptions to ignorantiajuris neminem excusat-mistake based on the
"advice of counsel" and the "indefiniteness" of a law-may be disposed
of briefly. The above analysis reveals the reason for the uniform holding that the advice of counsel regarding the meaning of a criminal law
is not a defense. It is not that the lawyer may be incompetent or cor88. Ibid.
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rupt,89 but that lawyers are not law-declaring officials; it is not their
function to interpret law authoritatively. Suppose that an opinion was
obtained from the most distinguished lawyers, that the subject was not
complicated, that numerous precedents were found, and that the law was
clear and simple-in short, a situation where knowledge of law was easy
to acquire. A person acts upon such advice, then a prosecution is instituted. His plea of ignorance would nonetheless be invalid because the
court before whom the case is tried cannot substitute the opinion of
counsel for its own "knowledge."9
This leads to a major conclusion previously suggested, namely, that
"knowledge" of law (and thus ignorance or mistake of it) has not only
the usual meaning discussed above but also a meaning that is distinctive
and decisive as regards the doctrine of ignorantiajuris. "Knowledge"
of the law in this context means coincidence with the subsequent interpretation of the authorized law-declaring official. If there is coincidence,
the defendant knew the law and his action is legal. If there is not coincidence, it can avail nothing that the defendant thought his conduct was
legal.9 This is the special meaning of ignorantia,which distinguishes it
from the ordinary meaning of ignorance, expressed, e.g., in ignorantia

facti.
The above analysis also indicates the invalidity of the other proposal, that indefiniteness in the meaning of a penal law should provide an
exception to the doctrine of ignorantiajuris. This problem is presently
dealt with in terms of strict construction and "due process." If a criminal
statute is ambiguous, its meaning is rendered "sufficiently" precise by
excluding the disadvantageous sense of the words. And if a penal statute
is vague, i.e., "too vague," it is unconstitutional.9 2 The survival of a rule,
after being subjected to the tests of strict construction and due process,
is an authoritative finding that it is sufficiently definite to constitute
law."' Accordingly, the defendant cannot be permitted to raise the question of indefiniteness again under a plea of ignorance of the law and
in Eng89. Despite occasional assertions to that effect, the obvious fact isthat, e.g.,
land, where the Bar is held in very high esteem, the doctrine of ignorantia juris is also
rigorously applied.
90. To allow such a defense would make "the opinion of the attorney paramount
So,
to the law." People v. McCalla, 63 Cal. App. 783, 795, 220 Pac. 436, 441 (1923).
too, in Needham v. State, 32 P.2d 92, 93 (Okla. 1934).
91. In the discussion of bigamy infra, advice of counsel is approved as a defense.
This advice, however, concerns the law of marriage and divorce, not criminal law.
92. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) ; United States v. Cohen Grocery
Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921).
93. "If the right to collect depends upon the construction of various statutes, and
is apparently doubtful, the officer should stop; for if he does not, he will proceed at
his peril." Levar v. State, 103 Ga. 42, 49, 29 S.E. 467, 470 (1897).
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avoid liability by that procedure. 4
But there are certain large areas of criminal law which are presently
assumed to be within the scope of ignorantiajuris although, actually, the
doctrine is not relevant to them. If this can be shown, the presently wide
range of the doctrine will be substantially narrowed and its meaning
should become proportionately clearer. One of the most important of
these situations concerns the effect of changes in the validity of a statute
or regulation. For example, a statute forbidding the sale of intoxicants
is held unconstitutional; then, this decision is overruled and the statute
is held constitutional. The courts usually state that they are required
to deal with ignorantiajuris in cases involving, e.g., the sale of intoxicants after the first decision and prior to the second, the validating, one.
They say this is an "exception" justified on the ground that it is "manifestly unfair" to hold the defendant to a greater knowledge of the law
than that possessed by the State's Supreme Court. But when an individual's conduct conforms to the decisions of the highest court, the claim
that he acted "in ignorance of the law" is almost fantastic. It is submitted that the above situation does not call for application of an exceptional rule because neither ignorance nor mistake of law is involved.
This is evident if the traditional theory of the unbroken validity of
the statute in question is repudiated so far as penal law is 'concerned.
The above situation would then be interpreted, in effect, as: enactment,
repeal by judicial decision, and "re-enactment" by the later decision."
The traditional theory should not apply to criminal law because the policy
prohibiting ex post facto enactment excludes the dependence of penal liability upon any subsequent law-making, such as a decision reversing a
previous one that held a statute unconstitutional. The traditional theory
implies that the law covers all possible situations and that it is certain
in meaning. At the opposite extreme is the skepticism which asserts that
the law is only what the judges in each particular case say it is-nothing
more. Neither theory is persuasive. Law does pre-exist, but not in the
degree of specificity required for all subsequent adjudications. It pre94. In the Lewis Case, 124 Tex. Crim. 582, 64 S.W.2d 972 (1933), although some
dicta might so imply, the decision was not placed on "indefiniteness," but rather on the
ground that "wilfully" required a inens rea that included knowledge of illegality. In
Burns v. State, 123 Tex. Crim. 611, 61 S.W.2d 512 (1933), both grounds were relied
on; greater emphasis was placed on the fact that the statute was "obscure and confusing." Such holdings usually refer ultimately to Cutter v. State, 36 N.J.L. 125 (1873),
which involved the taking of an illegal fee by a justice of the peace. But the language
of that opinion shows that the "obscurity" of the statute was relatively unimportant.
The decision emphasized inens rea, and did not purport to be an exception to ignorantia

juris.
95. This, however, does not explain how a void statute can be revived by the later
decision. It is preferable, therefore, to speak of the unconstitutional statute as unenforceable rather than void.
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exists "sufficiently" to bar arbitrariness and to limit the scope of judicial
legislation, but judicial decision plays an essential role in its development.
Without adding details, it may be concluded that when a court (certainly
the highest court) holds the law to be thus and so, that is what the law
is from that date on. Thus the correct ratio of the decisions dealing
with the above type of situation is not that the defendant acted in ignorance of the law, that it is unfair to require him to know the law when
the Supreme Court was ignorant of it, etc. It is, on the contrary, that
the defendant is not criminally liable because the law at the time he acted
was what the Supreme Court declared it to be; in short, his conduct
conformed to the law. 96
The above analysis can be applied to other problems which are presently confused in the same way. 7 In general, the same conclusion arrived at above is applicable to lower courts9 8 and to other law-declaring
officials, e.g., administrative officials.9 9 Hence, an individual who
conforms to such declarations should be protected without invoking
0
an "exception" to ignorantia juris."'
This seems equally applicable to
the following cases: conforming to the interpretation of a conservator of
game that dynamiting fish is permissible;1. to that of officials of the
State's corporation department, including the corporation commissioner,
that certain instruments are not "securities," and that a permit to sell
them is not needed;12 and to a ruling by election judges that the defendant is privileged to vote.'
Such opinions rendered by officials who
96. See Cardozo, J., in Great No. Ry. v. Sunburst Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364-65 (1932)
and State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 126 N.W. 454, and Annot., 33 L.R.A. (n.s.) 788,
794, 797 (1910).
97. E.g., to a statute that repeals an older one, during which time the act in question
occurs, then the repealing statute is declared unconstitutional. See Claybrook v. State,
164 Tenn. 440, 51 S.W.2d 499 (1932).
98. Reliance upon a decision of a county circuit court has been supported. Wilson
v. Goodin, 291 Ky. 144, 150, 163 S.W.2d 309, 313 (1942). See, also, State ex rel. Williams v. Whitman, 116 Fla. 196, 156 So. 705 (1934). But it has been held that reliance
upon a decision of a municipal court is not a defense: ". . . we refuse to hold that
the decisions of any court below, inferior to the Supreme Court, are available as a defense, under similar circumstances." State v. Striggles, 202 Iowa 1318, 1320, 210 N.W.
137, 138 (1926). And see note 104 infra.
99. See United States v. 100 Barrels of Vinegar, 188 Fed. 471 (D. Minn. 1911)
and, generally, Lee, Legislative and Interpretive Regulations,29 GEo. L.J. 1, 25-29 (1940).
100. See Morgenthau, Implied Regulatory Powers in Administrative Law, 28 IOWA
L. REV. 575 (1943).

101. State v. Freeland, 318 Mo. 560, 567, 300 S.W. 675, 677 (1927). The court
cited the Cutter and O'Neil cases sufpra notes 94 and 96 and also noted that the regulation in issue was inalum prohibitum, not nalun in se. Cf. People v. McCalla, 63 Cal.
App. 783, 793-94, 220 Pac. 436, 439-40 (1923) where, under similar facts, advice of
counsel was rejected, and "knowingly" and "wilfully" were held not to require knowledge of the law.
102. People v. Ferguson, 134 Cal. App. 41, 24 P.2d 965 (1933).
103. See State v. Pearson, 1 S.E. 914 (N.C. 1887), and State v. Boyett, 32 N.C.
246 (1849).
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are primarily responsible for the administration of the laws they interpret"'0 are law-declarations within their competence. Conduct which
conforms to them should be held legal." 5
Closely related to the above are cases of officials charged with the
violation of laws governing the exercise of their own duties. Since their
office requires them to interpret these statutes, such interpretations are
law-declarations if they are honestly made; and their conduct in conformity with them is not criminal. The relevant cases exculpating judicial officers, usually justices of the peace, are limited to interpretations
of the very statutes which prescribe their official duties. Thus an official could not defend on the ground that he conformed to his interpretation of penal statutes when that was outside the scope of his duties.'
Moreover, the defense might well be limited to ordinary interpretations
of the law, which, e.g., would exclude opinions that the laws in question
were unconstitutional."' Finally, the above defense, i.e., that the conduct
was legal, need not be extended to ministerial officers who, in the discharge of their duties, acted upon their own interpretations of penal
laws. There is another defense, however, that is sometimes available
to such persons as well as to judicial officers, namely, that certain penal
This is part of the
statutes require a knowing violation of the law.'
larger problem to be discussed next.
Knowledge of Illegality Included in Mens Rea
This problem arises chiefly in relation to larcency, embezzlement, malicious destruction of property, wilful trespasses and other similar offenses
where the defendant did not know that another person's legal rights were
being violated. The uniform exculpation of the defendants in these
cases 0 0 does not represent an exception to ignorantiajuris neminem ex104. In People v. Settles, 29 C. A.2d 781, 78 P.2d 274, 276 (1938) the California
Superior Court refused to exculpate a defendant who had received a license to conduct
a "game of skill" from the Los Angeles police department on the ground that the
statute in issue (concerning lotteries) was part of the State's Penal Code, hence the city
police had no authority to interpret it and grant licenses. The Court approved the
Ferguson decision, supra note 102, on the ground that the official there "was directly
"
charged with the duty of enforcing the law ...
105. See 22 CALIF. L. REv. 569, 570-71 (1934).
106. State v. McLean, 121 N.C. 589, 28 S.E. 140 (1897) ; Skeen v. Craig, 31 Utah
20, 86 Pac. 487 (1906).
107. Cf. Leeman v. State, 30 Ark. 438 (1880) ; Hunter v. State, 158 Tenn. 63, 12
S.W.2d 361 (1928), 61 A.L.R. 1148, 1153 (1929).
108. E.g., Lewis v. State, 124 Tex. Crim. 582, 64 S.W.2d 972 (1933).
109. Larceny-Rex v. Clayton, 15 Crim. App. R. 45 (1920); Queen v. Reed,
[1842] C. & M. 306, 174 Eng. Rep. 519; especially interesting is Rex v. Gilson and
Cohen, 29 Crim. App. R. 174 (1944); Embezzlement-Lewis v. People, 99 Colo. 102,
60 P.2d 1089 (1936); Robbery-Barton v. State, 88 Tex. Crim. 368, 227 S.W. 317
(1921); Forgery-Regina v. Parish, [1837] 8 C. & P. 93, 173 Eng. Rep. 413; Malicious
destruction of property-Regina v. Twose, 14 Cox C.C. 327 (1879); Receiving stolen
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cusat. It is not because the defendants were ignorant of the law that
they are not criminals, but because, being ignorant of certain law, they
lacked the required mens reef. Can these cases be distinguished from
criminal homicide and other crimes where ignorance of the illegality of
the conduct is not relevant to the mens rea?
In the above cases, the defendants were mistaken regarding the law
of property,"' hence their exculpation would obviously not involve any
exception to ignorantia juris neminem excusat if that doctrine, when

employed in penal law, were interpreted to exclude property law. A good
deal of confusion has resulted from the thesis that crimes against property require a "specific intent" while others, e.g., criminal homicide, require only a "general intent." Actually, there is no such mental state as
a "general intent"; all intentions are specific in that they are directed
towards particular goals. Thus, the intent in property crimes is no more
specific than is the intentional shooting at A, but hitting X."' Moreover, no insight or elucidation is provided regarding the above problem
by asserting that property crimes require a specific intent, since this
merely reiterates, only more vaguely, that the relevant mens rea includes
a belief in the illegality of the conduct.
If we compare (1) a situation where the defendant shoots a trespasser, thinking he has a legal right to do so, and (2) the typical property
case, where the defendant takes a chattel, thinking he has a legal right to
its possession, we note that both situations involve private and criminal
law. In (1) the defendant's ignorance of the law is not a defense to a
criminal charge, whereas in (2) it is. The reason is not merely that the
mistake in (2) concerns property law but rather that in (1) we have
facts that are directly characterized as criminal, i.e., there is a penal law
that proscribes shooting a trespasser whereas in (2) we do not have such
facts. In (1) no private law exists which can place any interpretation on
the facts that would alter their meaning for penal law; in (2) no meaning can be ascribed to the facts that is relevant to the penal law until the
defendant's opinion regarding the right of possession is determined. But
this is little more than recognizing, somewhat more clearly, perhaps, that
in some crimes an opinion regarding certain private law qualifies the
criminal significance of the conduct. Such opinions function as facts,
property-Robinson v. State, 84 Ind. 452, esp. 456 (1882); State v. Rountree, 80 S.C.
387, 61 S.E. 1072 (1908), 22 L.R.A. (n.s.) 833 (1909) ; State v. Alpert, 88 Vt. 191, esp.
204, 92 Atl. 32, esp. 37 (1914) ; unlawfully removing timber from Federal lands-Stone
v. United States, 167 U.S. 178, 189 (1897). See note 31 supra. The legal mistakes need
not be reasonable. See Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 88 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 35, 52 (1939).
110. See Perkins, supra note 109, at 51; RADULESCO, op. cit. supra note 76, at 13-14.

111.

HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW

450-53 (1947). See supra note 23.
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and such ignorance or mistake falls within the meaning and purpose of
ignorantiafacti. But is there an underlying reason for this?
It was suggested above that it is not the distinction between private
and penal law or even the factual quality of the error regarding the former, but the moral significance of the respective norms, and consequently of the defendant's conduct, that is decisive. Accordingly, "jutis"
should not be restricted to criminal law nor should a plea of ignorance of
all non-penal law be allowed. For example, parts of torts and family
law, like the law defining the major crimes, also reflect simple moral
values. The plea of lack of rmens rea, resulting from ignorance of the
above property law; is not inconsistent with the ethical principle that it
is wrong to steal another's chattel. That value is not contradicted if the
actor thinks he has a right to its possession. On the other hand, a defendant's plea of ignorance of the criminal law, e.g., in killing a trespasser, would contradict the ethics of the criminal law. This conclusion
regarding ignorance of certain private law is consistent with ignorantia
facti excusat. For there, too, the defendant does not challenge the moral
norms represented in the criminal law. It may be noted, finally, that
"knowledge" of certain private law is given its ordinary meaning, similar to "knowledge of fact" and that, so far as penal law is concerned, the
principle of legality is compatible with the recognition, as a defense, of
certain mistakes of law, indicated above.
In other areas of major crime, besides the property offenses, knowledge of the illegality of an act has been recognized as an essential element
of the relevant mens rea, e.g., certain conspiracies... and serious income
tax offenses. Thus a charge of wilful failure to report taxable income
may be controverted by showing a mistaken interpretation of the relevant
tax law. In Hargrove..3 the defendant was convicted of "wilfully failing" to file a tax return for certain years and "wilfully and knowingly"
attempting to evade payment of taxes. Evidence that he had relied upon
the advice of a tax expert was excluded by the trial judge who instructed
the jury: "Ignorance of the law, of course, gentlemen, is not excused.
The question of wilfullness and intent rests, then and depends upon
whether you find that the defendant wilfully and knowingly did what
he intended to do. .

.

. A man may have no intention to violate the law

and yet if he wilfully and knowingly does a thing which constitutes a
violation of the law he has violated the law." On appeal, the conviction
was reversed: Where a statute denounces "as criminal only [the] . .
112. Commonwealth v. Rudnick, 318 Mass. 45, 60 N.E.2d 353 (1945); Commonwealth v. Benesch, 290 Mass. 125, 194 N.E. 905 (1935).
113. Hargrove v. United States, 67 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1933).
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wilful doing [of an act] . . . a specific wrongful intent, that is, actual
knowledge of the existence of obligation and a wrongful intent to evade
11 4
it, is of the essence.3
The most serious failure to recognize that certain crimes require a
belief in the illegality of the conduct is found in bigamy cases. Here the
issues are clouded, partly by the assumption that the doctrine of ignorantia juris includes any law, private as well as penal, and partly by the
dogma that bigamy does not require a criminal intent. In some States
the problem has been avoided by express provisions, e.g., requiring knowledge of the continuance of the first marriage. But most of the statutes
are silent as to that; they run in the traditional terms of "a person who, being married, goes through a form of marriage." These
statutes have often been interpreted to exclude mens rea, i.e., just as
strictly as petty "public welfare" regulations." 5 In this country, the
chief influence has been the Mash case, decided more than a century ago,
which held that even a reasonable mistake regarding the death of the
spouse was no defense.' 16 In some jurisdictions this is still the law, and
the occasional judicial suggestion that the legislature ought to do something about it"' is small comfort to honest persons serving long sentences in prison cells. Moreover, so long as reasonable mistake of a material fact is not recognized as a defense, it is practically impossible even
to consider that a mistake of law may exclude mens rea in bigamy.
Whatever might have been said for such strict liability when Mash
was decided, the continued exclusion of even reasonable mistakes of fact
from ignorantiafacti excusat after the Tolson case" 8 is indefensible. A
typical bigamy statute was carefully analyzed there by a very able court
which held that a reasonable belief in a spouse's death was a defense
despite the fact that the second marriage occurred prior to the expiration
of the specified time, i.e., that the statute, although completely silent regarding mens rea, nonetheless required it. Ever since the Tolson decision, it has been widely recognized that mens rea is required in bigamy.
114. Id. at 823. So, too, held in Haigler v. United States, 172 F.2d 986 (10th Cir.
1949) reversing the conviction where the trial judge, in addition to several correct instructions, instructed that ignorance of the law was no excuse. In United States v.
Di Silvestro, 147 F. Supp. 300, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1957) the recognized rule regarding the
required mens rea was thus stated: "Although that [ignorance of the law] is no defense
to a crime in itself, it may be shown in a crime like the present where wilfullness is an
element in that it may negative wilfullness in failure to perform the duty."
115. "This rule has been applied in a great variety of cases, from breaches of
police regulations to bigamy, adultery, and statutory rape." State v. Ackerly, 79 Vt. 69,
72, 64 Atl. 450, 451 (1906). So, too, Cornett v. Commonwealth, 134 Ky. 613, 121 S.W.
424 (1909).
116. Commonwealth v. Mash, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 472 (1844).
117. Commonwealth v. Hayden, 163 Mass. 453, 40 N.E. 846 (1895).
118. Queen v. Tolson, [1889] 23 Q.B. 168.
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But that decision or, at least, what was suggested there regarding nzens
rea was restricted by Rex v. Wheat and Stocks. 9 to belief in the death
of the spouse; elsewhere, it was held, mens rea is not required in bigamy. 2 ' Despite the prestige of English law in the Commonwealth, however, various courts in the latter jurisdictions have followed the wider
implications of Tolson. The emphasis is properly placed on the necessity
of mens rea in bigamy. 2' Most courts which recognize reasonable mistake of fact as a defense still have difficulty in reaching sound decisions
because it is assumed that wherever there is a mistake of law, there is no
defense, '2 2 and many of the situations include mistaken opinions regarding both facts and law--the so-called "mixed" questions. If. ignorantiajuris were limited to penal law and simple aspects of tort, family
law etc., or if at least technical rules of private law, unsupported by
moral attitudes, were excluded from the doctrine, it would usually be
superfluous to decide whether the mistake was one of law or fact. As
was suggested above, the issue would concern what was relevant to an
actual ines rea.
The issues in the bigamy cases parallel those involved in the property
offenses discussed above, and ignorantia juris neminem excusat is 'no
more relevant in the former than it is in larceny; conversely, it is equally
relevant to require knowledge of the illegality in both. In bigamy there is
no inens rea if the defendant believes the first marriage was legally dissolved, just as it is now recognized that an erroneous opinion that the
defendant has a legal right to the possession of a chattel excludes the
animus furandi of larceny. Accordingly, the defendant's ignorance of
technical divorce law, e.g., rules of jurisdiction, should be a defense.'
Although it may not be wise to restrict the doctrine of ignorantiajuris to
penal law," 4 that is the most likely starting-point to achieve a sound
119.

(1910).

[1921] 2 K.B. 119. For American cases, see Annot., 27 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1097

120. English law had previously indicated that reasonable mistake of law was a
defense. Rex v. Connatty, 83 J.P. 292 (1919) ; Rex v. Thompson, 70 J.P. 6 (1905).
121. Thomas v. The King, 59 Commw. L. R. 279 (Austr. 1931); The King v.
Carswell, [1926] N.Z. L.R. 321 (C.A. 1926); Cf. Rex v. Sellars, 9 Cox C.C. 153 (1905).
122. See Dixon, J., in Thomas v. The King, 59 Commw. L.R. 279, 306-07 (Austr.
1931) and Weigall, Mens Rea and Bigamy, 16 AusTR. L. J. 3, 5-6 (1942).
123. But cf. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
124. For some of the difficulties that arose from such a sweeping restriction, see
Mannheim, Mens Rea in German and English Law, 17 J. Comp. LEG. & INT'L L. at 248-

49 (1935).
125. The range of ignorantia jinns in private law is not directly involved in the
present problem but the same considerations would seem to apply. See Note: Mistake
of Law: A Suggested Rationale, 45 HARv. L. REv. 336 (1931). On the other hand, in
agreements and in other transactions there is an autonomous sphere where the parties
are, in effect, permitted to legislate for themselves. The intent of the parties is correspondingly important, e.g., in allowing reformation. The further relaxation of the
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perspective.' 25 This is indicated in the exclusion of the is civile from
the scope of the doctrine by Roman jurisconsults," 6 in the commentaries
of distinguished civilians, and in various codes of penal law." 7 In any
case, it seems clear that strict liability in bigamy"' is incompatible with
the ethics of modern penal liability.
Nor does the claim that bigamy is a statutory offense warrant strict
liability even if "legislative intention" and public welfare enactments
suggest easy rationalizations. For, although it is true that a statute of
James I gave the common law courts jurisdiction over what was previously an ecclesiastical concern, statutes of the vintage of James I have
long been treated as part of the common law in this country. What is
important is not that bigamy is a statutory offense, but the fact that the
penalty is severe. This should definitely establish the position, supportable also on other grounds noted above, that bigamy requires a inens rea,
e.g., entry into a marriage with knowledge of an existing one.
The tacit recognition of the validity of this position is reflected in
the sentences imposed: in Mash,"9 a governor's pardon; in Wheat and
Stocks, imprisonment for one day "which means that they were immediately discharged" ;...
in two similar cases,"' imprisonment for one week.
This contrast between hard law and soft administration makes it pertinent
to ask, as did a New Zealand judge, "Why then .

.

.

should the Legis-

lature be held to have wished to subject him to punishment at all?""'
For the above reasons the continued interpretation of bigamy as a strict
liability offense, the premise that this is required by ignorantia juris,
and the imposition of severe penalties can only be characterized as both
cruel and unenlightened.
doctrine in private law, e.g., as a defense to specific performance, suggests that some
weight must be given to the principle implied in the Roman restriction of the maxim
to ius naturale. See RADOULESCO, op. cit. supra, note 76, at 25.
126. RADULESCO, op. cit. supra note 76, at 25, 27.
127. See id. at 13-15. Cf. Blackstone's statement, "...
a mistake in point of
law . . . is in criminal cases no sort of defence." 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *27
follows a specific illustration of a mistake in criminal law. Cf. Lord Westbury in
Cooper v. Phibbs, 16 L.T.R. (n.s.) 678, 683 (1867) ; Lord King in Lansdown v. Lansdown, [1730] Moseley 364, 365, 25 Eng. Rep. 441 (1730); Art. 5, Italian Penal Code

of 1930.
128. As regards strict liability in adultery, see State v. Woods, 107 Vt. 354, 179 Atl.
1 (1935).

129. Commonwealth v. Mash, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 472 (1844).
130. Weigall, supra note 122, at 8.

131.

Cited ibid.

132. Sim, J., In The King v. Carswell, [1926] N.Z.L.R. 321, 339 (C.A. 1926).
Cf. ". . . it is submitted that (a) it is illogical to allow prisoner's honest belief in

death to be a defence and to reject the plea of honest belief that a divorce had been
granted: (b) that the prisoner should be acquitted if he raises a doubt as to the validity
of the first marriage: (c) that honest belief in the invalidity of the first marriage
should be a defence." Paton, Bigamy and Mens Rea, 17 CAN. B. Rav. 94, 101 (1939).
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A minority of American courts have recognized the unsoundness
and injustice of treating bigamy as a strict liability offense. As long ago
as 1874 the Indiana Supreme Court reversed a conviction of bigamy
partly because the trial court refused to charge that "the honest belief83
that his former wife had been divorced from him" was a defense.
Subject to the qualification that the defendant "had used due care and
made due inquiry to ascertain the truth," the Court held: "The same
rule [i.e. acquittal] would apply to the dissolution of the marriage relation by divorce as by death."' 4 In this case the defendant's error regarding the divorce was treated as a mistake of fact.
It is only quite recently, however, that these issues have been carefully analyzed by American Courts. In Long 3 a decree of divorce had
been granted the defendant in Arkansas against his wife who continued
to live in Delaware and testified that she had not been "served with
any divorce papers" or had any notice by mail of the Arkansas action.
The conviction of bigamy was set aside on the ground that the trial
court erred in refusing to admit evidence that the defendant had in good
faith followed the advice of a lawyer both before the Arkansas action
and also after the decree of divorce and prior to the second marriage.
Allowing the defense of mistake of law in the above circumstances
(despite the invalidity of the Arkansas decree), the Supreme Court of
Delaware emphasized that, "The defendant would have the burden of
demonstrating that his efforts [to ascertain the relevant law] were well
nigh exemplary."' 8
The New Jersey Supreme Court considered the same issue in De
Meo s7 in 1955. De Meo had gotten a Mexican "mail-order divorce"
which, the Court observed, is widely considered in this country to be
"valueless" and, in addition, he had taken no "reasonable steps toward
ascertaining the legal validity of the divorce; indeed, if such steps had
been taken they would quickly have disclosed its utter worthlessness."' 8
Although the conviction was affirmed, it is very significant that the
133. Squire v. State, 46 Ind. 459, 461 (1874).

134. Id. at 463. See, too, Baker v. State, 86 Nebr. 775, 782-83, 126 N.W. 300,
302-03 (1910), following the Indiana decision supra, Robinson v. State, 6 Ga. App. 696,
65 S.E. 792, 795-96 (1909), State v. Cain, 106 La. 708, 31 So. 300 (1902). A defense
was implied in Gillum v. State, 141 Tex. Crim. 162, 147 S.W.2d 778 (1941) although
the conviction was affirmed on the ground of lack of reasonable inquiry by the defendant.
135. Long v. State, 44 Del. (5 Terry) 262, 65 A.2d 489 (1949).
136. Id. at 282-83, 65 A.2d at 499. "It would not be enough merely for him to say
that he had relied on advice of an attorney, unless the circumstances indicated that his
conduct throughout in seeking to ascertain the law and in relying on advice received

manifested good faith and diligence beyond reproach." Id. at 283, 65 A.2d at 499.
137. State v. DeMeo, 20 N.J. 1, 118 A.2d 1 (1955).
138. Id. at 14, 118 A.2d at 8.
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Court states in the closing lines of the decision that they "expressly
withhold determination as to the availability 'in situations not before us'
of a defense to a bigamy prosecution resting upon the defendant's honest
belief, reasonably entertained, that he was legally free to remarry in New
Jersey." Even more significant, from the viewpoint of criminal theory,
is Justice Wachenfeld's vigorous dissent. He insisted that a decree of
divorce should be a defense even though it is void and widely known to
be void "unless this general knowledge is imputed or brought home to
the defendant. . . . ""' De Meo had made a full disclosure of the facts
on his application for the marriage license. "It must come as a distinct
shock to an honest person who has made full disclosure to his sovereign
state . . . to find that without wrongful or criminal intent he automatically becomes a convict on a criminal charge which he cannot even
defend because the court refuses to accept the very evidence he relied upon and which was . . . approved by the state itself at the time he made
his original intentions known."
The California Supreme Court recently dealt with similar issues in
Vogel. 4'
The defendant was not permitted by the trial court to introduce evidence that his wife had told him she was going to secure a divorce
in a jurisdiction unknown to him so that he could not contest the custody
of their children, that, during his absence in military service, she had
lived with a certain man as his wife and that when she was injured in an
automobile accident, she identified herself as that man's wife. Reversing
the conviction and earlier decisions, the California Supreme Court held
that "a bona fide and reasonable belief" that he was free to marry was
a defense to a bigamy charge. The Court added that "reliance on a
judgment of divorce or annulment that is subsequently found not to be
the 'judgment of a competent Court' " is also a defense. Moreover,
"since it is often difficult for laymen to know when a judgment is not
that of a competent court, we cannot reasonably expect them always to
have such knowledge and make them criminals if their bona fide belief
proves to be erroneous."''
These recent decisions strengthen the American minority position considerably and indicate that other jurisdictions
may pursue a similar path.
Petty Offenses
One result of the above discussion is to narrow the scope of ignorantia juris neminem excusat considerably since many situations presently
treated as both within the meaning of, and also "exceptions" to, that
139. Id. at 15, 118 A.2d at 9.
140. People v. Vogel, 46 C.2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956).
141. Id. at 854-55.
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doctrine were shown to be irrelevant to it. The correct ratio decidendi
of the cases dealing with those situations is either that the requisite mens
rea included knowledge that the act was illegal (larceny, bigamy) or that
the act conformed to the law declared by the authorized officials. Ignorantiajuris, as thus restricted, was defended in terms of its rationalea fusion of the principle of legality and the ethics of criminal law. We shall
now consider the implications of this theory of ignorantiajuris with reference to the reform of that doctrine in relation to certain petty offenses.
In an ideal system, ancient laws, no longer useful, would be discarded by a rule of desuetude. The legislature would never enact laws
favoring special interests; like Plato's ideal legislator, it would be influenced only by reason and science. And all normal persons would be
sufficiently sensitive and informed to recognize even very minor offenses as immoral. In such circumstances, it could be said with complete persuasiveness that any person who intentionally or recklessly did
anything forbidden by the criminal law, however small the penalty, acted
immorally and merited penal liability.
But actual systems of penal law fall short of such perfection. In
the absence of any principle of desuetude, there are instances of prosecutors' digging into ancient books to exhume and enforce long-forgotten
statutes.'42 As regards some minor offenses, newly created ones, and
those regulating certain businesses, there is frequently a gap between
public opinion and the policy of the enactment, between mores and
morality. These segments of existing criminal law raise serious questions concerning the reform of ignorantiajuris neminem excwsat.
The principle of mens rea requires the voluntary commission of a
harm forbidden by penal law. Accordingly, if there was conduct expressing a mens rea and the relevant penal law had been promulgated, the
ethical conditions of modern penal liability are satisfied.4 3 But as regards certain criminal offenses, indicated immediately above, the knowledge that the relevant conduct is legally forbidden is an essential element
of its immorality.'" This is quite different from the judicial distinction
142. See Everhart v. People, 54 Colo. 272, 130 Pac. 10Y6 (1913).
143. Opportunity to examine and study the laws is implied in democratic theory
which would not be satisfied if conflicts were adjudicated according to laws inaccessible
to public inquiry. In addition, promulgation is a condition of valid determination of the
law, i.e., the ground of adjudication must be public to permit criticism and appraisal.
But these do not imply that knowledge of law is essential to the just imposition of
criminal liability. The principle of legality functions primarily as a limitation on official conduct, not as a determinate of culpability. It rests on the wide ethical considerations that concern the legitimacy of a government. And see note 165 infra.
144. "Knowingly and intentionally to break a statute must . . . always be morally
wrong. . .

."
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between mala in se and mala prohibita. For, on the one hand, it does not
imply that the former (i.e., major offenses) are immoral "apart from
positive law"; nor, as regards the latter, does it imply that an act becomes
immoral because it is legally forbidden. How could the mere prohibition
under sanctions of force effect such a change? The distinction that
should be made, it is submitted, is that some acts are immoral regardless
of the actor's ignorance of their being legally forbidden (e.g., the felonies
and principal misdemeanors) whereas other acts are immoral only because the actor knows they are legally forbidden.'4 5 This would reenforce the writer's criticism of strict liability.'
If that judicial construction were abandoned, then, instead of saying that because an act is
malum prohibitum it is unnecessary to find any criminal intent, the rule
would be that, since the only rational basis for finding a criminal intent
in these cases is knowledge that the act is legally forbidden, a finding of
such knowledge is essential. As was suggested above, ignorance of penal
law, of itself, i.e., of sheer positivist illegality, presents no general ground
for exculpation. But as regards certain petty offenses, where normal
conscience (moral attitudes) and understanding cannot be relied upon
to avoid the forbidden conduct, knowledge of the law is essential to
culpability; hence the doctrine of ignorantiajuris should not be applied
there.
Since the questions requiring determination, in order to demark the
exact area within which ignorance of the law is a defense, are beyond the
province of the judicial function, the need for legislation is clear. A
likely area would include recent misdemeanors punishable only by small
fines, various ordinances and technical regulations of administrative
boards. 4 Here actual knowledge of the illegality should be required. 4
It seems necessary to retain the presumption that there was such knowledge, allowing the defendant to introduce evidence tending to prove his
ignorance or mistake of the law, but placing the final burden of proving
145. Cf. "This rule, [ignorantiajuris] essential to the orderly administration of
justice, is harsh when applied to what is only nzlum prohibituin." 1 BisHoP, CRIMINAL
LAW 198 (9th ed. 1923). See Glaser, Ignorantia Juris dans le Droit Pinal, REv. DR.
PtNAL ET DE CRIM. ET ARCH. INTN'L Mitl. LEG.

133 (1931).

146. HALL, op. cit. supra note 111, c. 10.
147. Cf. RADULESCO, op. cit. supra note 76, at 74. He quotes Haus' proposal to include new laws that penalize what was formerly legal. Id. at 100. See Zakrasek v.
State, 197 Ind. 249, 150 N.E. 615 (1926) and Rex v. Ross, [1945] B.C. Co. Ct., 3
D.L.R. 574.
148. See Mannheim, supra note 124, at 247, L. Hall and Seligman, supra note 3, at
661-62, and the important United States Supreme Court 5-4 decision in Lambert v. California, 26 Law Week 4059 (Dec. 17, 1957).
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mens rea, in the above sense, upon the State.149
The above general direction to be taken in reform of ignorantiajuris
seems defensible, but certain difficult questions need to be considered
somewhat further. If we examine the petty offenses more closely, we
find that there are different types of them. First, as noted, there are
archaic, long forgotten offenses the curiosities of the statute-book and,
also, other obviously unsound enactments; and second, there are new,
technical and regulative offenses, e.g., that it is criminal to drive an uninsured automobile, that land must be used in conformity with the purpose of a local authority, that it is criminal to sell eggs except on a prescribed grading system,' that minimum wages determined by certain
classifications must be paid to certain employees, 5 ' that one who undertakes the care of a foster child for reward must give notice to the local
welfare authorities, and so on.' 52 But third, some petty offenses, e.g.,
insults, minor assaults and others are neither new nor technical; instead,
they are well known and many of them are of the same type of harm as
major crimes, only less serious. And fourth, there are petty offenses
which are not intuitively recognized as immoral,' but if the forbidden
harm is considered, the correct evaluation will be made. As will appear,
this criterion raises difficult questions.
Reform is also complicated by the fact that to some degree there is
an unavoidable clash between the principles of criminal law and historical
accretions. For example, if criminal theory5 is based upon principles
defining "harm" partly in terms of morality, the first class lies outside
its range. So, too, if mnens rea is defined in terms of objective morality,
the law cannot admit, nor is it the judge's function to allow, nullification
of any law on the ground that it is unsound. Reform can, of course,
override such theoretical considerations and, on practical grounds, warrant the restriction of the doctrine of ignorantiajuris.
In addition to a classification of petty offenses, perhaps along the
lines of the criteria suggested above, there are other important questions
to be decided with regard to reform of the doctrine. For example,
should every kind of ignorance of the law defining the designated petty
149. As was noted supra, the proof would be in "operational" terms, showing, e.g.,
that the necessary information had been brought to the defendant's attention or that he
had avoided that.
150. Witte, A Break For the Citizen, 9 STATE GOVERNMENT 73 (1936).
151. Borderland Const. Co. v. State, 49 Ariz. 523, 68 P.2d 207 (1937).

152. See note 79 supra.
153. E.g., carrying a pistol in public: Crain v. State, 69 Tex. Crim. 55, 153 S.W. 155
(1913). Travel interstate with intent to avoid testifying in a criminal case: Hemans
v. United States, 163 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1947). Tapping the wife's telephone wire:
United States v. Gris, 247 F.2d 860, 864 (1957).
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offenses be a defense or should only "invincible" ignorance be thus
recognized? Should the prosecution be required to prove not only that
the ignorance was vincible but also that it was the result of recklessness?
And, still within the specified area of petty offenses, should mistake of
the relevant penal law be distinguished and treated differently from
ignorance of it?
A person who is ignorant of a law or regulation may have been on
the high seas when it was adopted 5 5 or he may have been in a hospital
or so distraught with serious troubles that he failed to read the newspaper or a bulletin of his Association, giving the pertinent information.
These may be instances where definite use can be made of "invincible
ignorance" consistently with the test of recklessness. Or, the defendant
may be very inexperienced in the operation of his new business or merely
stupid, but not to the point of legally recognized incompetence. On the
other hand, the defendant may have received the necessary publication
or other information but was indifferent to it or positively set against
acquiring knowledge of the pertinent rules. Except for the last, the recklessly ignorant, there is no mens rea in the above cases. As has been
urged with reference to negligence, education, not punishment, is indicated wherever ignorance is not the result of a voluntary indifference
to the acquisition of the relevant legal knowldge. Such pleas of ignorance of the law do not contradict the principle of legality.
Mistake of law, however, raises more difficult problems. 5 ' The
mistaken person is in a more meritorious position than the recklessly
ignorant one since he has made an effort, perhaps to the extent of consulting a lawyer, to discover what his duty is under the criminal law.
That certainly recommends mitigation; indeed, if knowledge of the illegality is the only ground for inferring a mens rea, there should be complete exculpation.' 57 This would seem to apply rather clearly to the first
two classes of petty offenses, noted above. On the other hand, the plea
of mistake implies that the penal law in question was actually brought
to the defendant's attention, that he examined the relevant words in the
code, statute or decisions. This places the defendant in a much less
favorable position than that of the invincibly ignorant person. For
error implies acquaintance and opportunity to form a correct opinion
155.
156.

Rex v. Bailey, [1800] Russell and Ryan 1, 168 Eng. Rep. 651.
Mistake of law is distinguished from ignorance of law and it is stated that

the former should not be a defense, 2 MOLINIER, TRAITk TH-ORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE
DROIT PkNAL 210-11 (1894), citing 1 CARRARA, PROGRAMME DU COURS DU DROIT
CRIMINEL 209, note (transl. Baret).
157. This would seem to contradict the requirement of "invincibility" since, on the
usual premise regarding the meaning of "ignorantia" a lawyer has the competence to
acquire the correct legal knowledge.

IGNORANCE IN CRIMINAL LAW
and that might support a charge of recklessness.
But this estimate may be deemed too refined for everyday decision
and an exaggeration of the sensitivity of normal conscience regarding
the policy of petty offenses. It may be urged that all that is pertinent is
analysis of the meaning of certain words and a lawyer's definite opinion
of the scope of those words. As a practical matter, probably most persons would agree with Salmond, "That he who breaks the law of the
land disregards at the same time the principles of justice and honesty is
in many instances far from the truth. In a complex legal system a man
requires other guidance than that of common sense and a good con'
science."158
The difficulty, however, so far as ignorantia juris is concerned, is that the defendant and his lawyer, in effect, are setting their
interpretation of the words defining a penal law against that of the
authorized officials. 5 ' From a rigorous theoretical viewpoint, this is
precisely what a legal order cannot consistently admit. From that viewpoint, i.e., with reference to the principles of legality and mens rea (in its
objective meaning), and on the assumption that only social harms are
proscribed, mistake of penal law cannot be recognized as a defense.
Thus, the solution of this problem seems to be caught between two
fires. On the one hand, a defendant's interpretation of the law cannot
prevail over official declarations of it. But, on the other hand, where
mistakes of non-penal law directly, exclude mens rea, e.g., larceny, bigamy, etc., such mistakes are admitted for that purpose. But penal law,
presumably, is composed of moral norms, hence even the pettiest of penal
laws, by definition, proscribes a social harm binding on normal conscience. And theory also recalls the objective meaning of mens rea and
the judicial duty to assume that all penal laws are sound. But the voice
of practical sense replies that, in fact, the accepted "penal" law contains
many petty proscriptions of conduct which are not recognized by normal
persons as having moral significance, and that when social harm becomes
so diluted that it cannot be thus recognized, it is time in the sphere of
positive criminal law to do justice in light of the facts.
This is the kind of problem where authority should step in to resolve
the issues; and, as was suggested above, the proper authority is the legislature. Such practical resolution of a difficult problem should be respected in a branch of law that must represent thoughtful public attitudes. Legal systems survive and prosper despite the incompatibility of
some of their rules, indeed, because they are able to combine such an158. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 408 (10 ed. 1947). So, too, Lord Atkin in Proprietary Articles Trade Ass'n v. Atty. Gen. of Canada 11931] A.C. 310, 324.
159. Cf. Holmes, J., in Horning v. District 6f- Columbia, 254"'U.S. 135 (1920),
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tinomies. How much of such incompatibility a legal system can and
should tolerate is a question regarding which there are probably many
opinions.
Summary of the PrincipalProblems
The principal difficulties encountered in analysis of ignorantiajuris
and the reasons, also, for the apparent divergence among writers on the
subject, arise from several sources. First, is the failure to distinguish
theory from reform."' It is the function of theory to elucidate a problem in the fullest measure, while sound reform includes a creative element. Accordingly, there is bound to be some difference of opinion regarding proposed reforms, which cannot be resolved by theory. But
theory can guide reform, and it can discover and elucidate the bases upon
which proposed reforms rest.
A second, probably the greatest, source of difficulty is the assumption that ignorance or mistake of law concerns the same kind of questions as ignorance or mistake of fact, that they are phases of a single
problem, specifically, that "ignorantia" in the two doctrines has substantially the same meaning. Actually, however, "ignorantia" in the doctrine
ignorantiajuris has two quite different meanings. One of these is the
straightforward, generally assumed meaning-there is a subject matter
(law) and there is knowledge of it derived from the study of codes,
statutes, cases, treatises, dictionaries and experience. This is the meaning of "knowledge" of law and illegality, applied, accordingly, to "ignorantia," which seems to appeal particularly to civilian scholars. But
among common lawyers and, no doubt, for many civilians, "knowledge"
of law also has a very different meaning which, so far as ignorantiajuris
is concerned, is the decisive one. In this sense, "knowledge" does not
mean knowledge at all. As was seen above, it means an interpretation of
a law which coincides with the later relevant interpretation by the authorized officials. This is central to an understanding of the doctrine of
ignorantiajuris.
Third, difficulties arise concerning the meaning of "juris." What
needs to be known is whether a writer holds that at least the laws defining the major crimes have moral significance1 . or whether, on the contrary, the premise is that law and morals are separate spheres. From that
latter (positivist) viewpoint, "law," including "penal law," means a
command of the Sovereign or a hypothetical judgment that originated in
and conforms to superior positive laws, in brief, the so-called "formal"
160. HALL, op. cit. supra note 154.
161. Ibid.
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criteria. But when a non-positivist argues the question, his premise is
that morality is expressed in penal law. Thus the two theorists may
agree that "knowledge of penal law is essential to penal liability" when,
actually, there is sharp conflict-the one is thinking of the sheer positivity, the formal criteria, of penal law while the other is thinking of
its moral significance.
This issue can be clarified if it is agreed-as is usually implicitthat "Juris" in ignorantia juris be limited to the formal meaning of the
term. But this does not suffice since it is necessary to determine-how
much of positive law must be known? The general consensus is that
"Juris" in the doctrinal phrase has a wide meaning, e.g., at least all of
penal law, except certain petty enactments, and probably, also, those
simple aspects of torts, family law and other non-penal law which have
obvious moral significance. With reference to this meaning, the position
of those who insist on knowledge of the illegality as a condition of penal
liability seems obviously untenable. For it collides with the universally
recognized fact that it is impossible for anyone to know that law; and
this is quite persuasive even from the viewpoint of the ordinary meaning of "knowledge" of the law. To insist on what is impossible as a
condition of liability is to exclude liability entirely. Such a patent fallacy cannot be attributed to those who urge complete abandonment of
ignorantiajuris.
They attempt to secure their position by insistence that "juris"
means or should mean not a specialized knowledge of the law of even
the major crimes but only a "general" knowledge of it. Thus, they say,
the differences between murder and manslaughter need not be known, but
only that it is illegal to kill a human being, 62 and so on as regards the
other major crimes. It is submitted, however, with deference, that this
is not persuasive. This interpretation of "juris" departs drastically from
its usual meaning; and if we are presented with a proposed change in
the definition of that important term, restricting it to its simplest possible sense, it can easily be shown that the new meaning is not relevant
to the problems actually met in the application of ignorantiajuris, in its
present sense. For example, every normal person knows it is illegal to
steal, but is it illegal to keep money one finds, knowing that the owner
can be discovered? In some places a "finder's keepers" custom represents the common opinion. Everyone knows it is illegal to steal, but in
certain American states it was the custom that anyone was privileged to
162. Busch, L'Erreur de Droit, REv.
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take unbranded cattle.163 Everyone knows it is illegal to kill a human
being, but is it well-known that it is illegal to shoot a trespasser or to kill a
wife's paramour apprehended in adultery? It is precisely these ramifications of the penal law, "exceptional" only in a formal sense, which require the doctrines of objective mens rea and ignorantiajuris to support
penal liability. Accordingly, since there is no escape from the fact that
it is impossible to know this law regarding even the serious offenses,
criminal liability imposed in the above "exceptional" areas must rest on
grounds other than knowledge of the illegality.
The theory which posits criminal liability, in part, upon mens rea in
its recognized objective sense not only provides a defensible ground
of liability for the obviously immoral harms, it also provides a ground
for liability in the more difficult "exceptional" situations. That ground
may be criticized-legal justice is far from perfect individualized justice-but it does provide a rational basis for criminal liability which is
certainly preferable to having no basis at all. Moreover, as regards the
"exceptional" situations, the legal system and the methods of its interpretation by thoughtful disinterested persons improve upon lay
opinion. They provide objective bases for discovering the better answers
to serious moral problems.
Nor will it have escaped attention that to the extent that "knowledge" of law is given a vague, general meaning, e.g., that a mere feeling
or intuition of illegality suffices, that position tends to approximate mens
rea, the traditional requirement of moral culpability. Whatever plausibility the insistence upon knowledge of illegality achieves, results from
the unconscious, hardly avoidable identification of the sheer illegality
of the major harms with their known immorality. But it should not be
assumed by those who advocate abandonment of the doctrine of ignorantia juris that the contents of even the major penal laws have a common
quality or that there is any relation between morality or custom and that
content or that the fact that the major harms are commonly forbidden
by penal law supports their position. These factors concern non-legal
matters (in the agreed positivist sense) ; to the extent that they are relied
upon, the position approximates the traditional meaning of miens rea and
criminal responsibility.
A fourth source of uncertainty in the literature is the failure of
some writers to specify whether they are thinking of ignorantiajuris in
relation to the major crimes as well as to the petty offenses or whether
they have only the latter in mind. They often generalize without limitation, and the impression given is that they are advocating a very sweep163.
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ing reform, namely,. that knowledge of the illegality, in the positivist
sense, should be a required element in all crimes. Later, they are apt to
concede-sometimes at the very end of their argument and almost as an
aside-that, of course, no one will be permitted to plead that he did not
know murder, robbery, etc. are legally forbidden!..4 Obviously, the
failure to articulate the significance and implications of the concession
unsettles the entire argument. If the concession were dealt with at the
outset, it would be necessary to elucidate ignorantiajuris with reference
to the serious crimes and to view the remaining problem against the bulking fact of that explanation. Indeed, unless one does elucidate the doctrine in relation to the major crimes, its rationale is simply ignored.
Finally, various ethical-political arguments against ignorantia juris
are unclear because of the assumption that the moral significance of
penal law is unimportant or that there are no significant differences in
the content of the "commands of the State" regardless of whether they
concern capital felonies or petty technical rules of property law. In this
view the only defensible ground of criminal liability in any case is knowledge of the relevant illegality.'
So, too, on the above premises, democratic "ideology," as it is called, requires the abandonment of the doctrine of ignorantiajuris.
But if normal adults understand the simple morality that is relevant
to criminal law, insistence on knowledge of the formal penal law (except
as regards certain petty offenses discussed above) is not persuasive,
even apart from the illusory nature of such a requirement. Although
such insistence seems on the surface to exhibit greater concern for individual dignity and to afford greater protection, actually it does neither.
For it depreciates the moral significance of the principle of nens rea (requiring the voluntary commission of a legally forbidden harm) as a
ground of liability and, thus, the conception of man as a responsible
moral agent, i.e., influenced by morality and not requiring to know, in
164. This difficulty is aggravated in comparative studies. For example, in a recent case the German Supreme Court recognized ignorance of the law as a defense to
a charge of "coercion" against a lawyer who demanded fees from a client on threat of
ceasing to represent him in a pending action. In an article where it is asserted that
German penal law by this decision completely abandoned the doctrine of ignorantiajuris,
the writers, concluding their advocacy of such a reform, assert: "Nor would any manin legal systems which admit error of law as a defense-be heard to say that he did not
know the killing of a human being to be unlawful." Ryu and Silving Error Juris: A
Comparative Study, 24 U. OF CHI. L. Rxv. 421, 470 (1957).
165. It is sometimes argued that the ex post facto prohibition implies that knowledge of the law is essential to the just imposition of penal liability. But see note 143
supra. This cannot be the rationale of ex post facto because "knowledge" of the promulgated laws, in the special sense discussed above, is impossible. The above argument
confuses the principle of inens rea with that of legality.
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addition, that harms are illegal.16 6 And, since the proposed abandonment
of the doctrine of ignorantia juris implies the proportionate abandonment of the principle of legality (the "rule of law"), what remains is
not the assured protection of the individual, but unfettered authority."8 7
Of course, it would be very nice to have all the advantages of the criminal
law and, also, to apply its sanctions only to those who knew the law.
Unfortunately, no one has shown how this can be done in an inevitably
"second-best" world.
166. See Hall, Responsibility and Law, 42 A.B.A.J. 917 (1956).
167. HALL, op. cit. supra note 111, c. 2.

